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Summary
This thesis is on full implementation theory. In this literature, the mecha-
nism is designed such that all its equilibria reveal players’ true information and
achieve a given social choice function. The fundamental question addressed in
this literature is that which social choice functions are implementable and un-
der what assumptions. Most of the first results is negative (e.g., Satterthwaite,
1975, and Gibbard, 1973, for implementation in dominant strategies). Start-
ing with Maskin (1977), who gave necessary and sufficient conditions for Nash
implementation, researchers have studied implementation problems under var-
ious solution concepts. Abreu and Matsushima (1992) made an important step
in this direction. They showed that almost any social choice function is vir-
tually implementable. We explicitly and fully exploit the power of monetary
transfers and lotteries which are usually used in virtual implementation.
The first chapter shows that in a complete-information environment with
two or more players and a finite type space, any truthfully implementable so-
cial choice function can be fully implemented in backwards induction via a
finite perfect-information stochastic mechanism with arbitrarily small trans-
fers. This provides an improvement from the virtual implementation result by
Glazer and Perry (1996). With arbitrarily small transfers only off the equilibri-
vii
um path, the mechanism we construct is much less susceptible to renegotiation
problem.
the second chapter, we provides a dynamic mechanism which fully im-
plements any social choice function under initial rationalizability in complete
information environments. Accommodating any belief revision assumption,
initial rationalizability is the weakest among all the rationalizability concepts
in extensive form games. This mechanism is also robust to small amounts of
incomplete information about the state of nature. That is, the mechanism
not only fully implements any social choice function in complete information
environments but also does so in all nearby environments where players’ values
are private. Although our mechanism allows for monetary transfers out of the
solution path, we can make them arbitrarily small and even achieve its budget
balance when there are more than two players.
In the third chapter, we further exploit the transfers in an incomplete
information environments and show in private-value environments that any
incentive compatible rule is implementable with small transfers. Our mecha-
nism only needs small ex post transfers to make our implementation results
completely free from the multiplicity of equilibrium problem. In addition, our
mechanism possesses the unique equilibrium that is robust to higher-order be-
lief perturbations. We also provide a sufficient condition for implementation
viii
in interdependent-value environments and discuss the difficulty of extending






In a complete-information environment with two or more players and a finite
type space, we show that any truthfully implementable social choice func-
tion1 can be fully implemented in backward induction using a finite perfect-
information stochastic mechanism. Our result is achieved by invoking (1) a
dynamic stochastic mechanism, (2) arbitrarily small transfers, and (3) the do-
main restriction which rules out identical preferences and preference orderings
with complete indifference over all outcomes.
It is known that subgame-perfect implementation is more permissive than
1A social choice function is truthfully implementable if there exists a direct revelation
mechanism where truth-telling (i) is a Nash equilibrium, and (ii) implements the social
choice function. It is well known that any Nash implementable social choice function is
truthfully implementable. In Section 3, we show that truthful implementability is also a
necessary condition for our notion of implementation. When there are three or more players,
any social choice function is truthfully implementable, that is, truthful implementability is
trivially satisfied.
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Nash implementation (Moore and Repullo (1988)). Our result can be contrast-
ed with two existing perfect-information mechanisms which implement an arbi-
trary social choice function in subgame-perfect equilibrium.2 The mechanism
in Moore and Repullo (1988, Section 5.1) (henceforth, the MR mechanism)
imposes large off-equilibrium transfers, while the mechanism in Glazer and
Perry (1996) (henceforth, the GP mechanism) requires at least three players
and that the implementation be virtual, i.e., the desirable social outcome is
obtained only with large probability.3 Both mechanisms have thus been criti-
cized for their susceptibility to renegotiation (see Jackson (2001, p. 690)). In
contrast, our mechanism is a finite stochastic game with perfect information,
which ensures full implementation via backward induction through arbitrarily
small transfers off the equilibrium path, and no transfers on the equilibrium
path.
In a generic perfect-information game, the backward induction outcome is
induced by several notions of extensive-form rationalizability.4 Since we allow
2See Glazer and Perry (1996, p. 28) for a discussion of practical and theoretical reasons to
favor sequential/perfect-information mechanisms. In particular, they argue that “sequential
mechanisms, with backward induction as their solution concept, seem to be more intuitive
and simpler to understand than their simultaneous counterparts.” Nevertheless, since the
length of our constructed game form will grow as the imposed transfers vanish, the simplicity
of solving the game is subject to debate.
3See also Osborne and Rubinstein (1994, pp. 193-195) for an exposition of the result in
Glazer and Perry (1996).
4These solution concepts include, for example, the subgame rationalizability in Bernheim
(1984) and the extensive-form rationalizability in Pearce (1984). See also Battigalli and
Siniscalchi (2002) for an epistemic characterization of extensive-form rationalizability.
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for small transfers, our mechanism can be made generic to implement any
truthfully implementable social choice function in these notions of extensive-
form rationalizability. In contrast, Bergemann et al. (2011) show that a
stronger version of the monotonicity condition due to Maskin (1999) is neces-
sary for implementation in normal-form rationalizability.
Our result can also be contrasted with the static mechanism in Abreu
and Matsushima (1994) which fully implements any social choice function in
iterated deletion of weakly dominated strategies.5 The GP mechanism is a
dynamic counterpart of the mechanism in Abreu and Matsushima (1992a)
which achieves virtual implementation for any social choice function in a stat-
ic mechanism; in contrast, our result provides a dynamic counterpart of the
mechanism in Abreu and Matsushima (1994) which fully implements an arbi-
trary social choice function in a static mechanism.6 Abreu and Matsushima
(1994) extend the result in Abreu and Matsushima (1992a) from virtual imple-
mentation to full implementation, but strengthen the solution concept from
5In Abreu and Matsushima (1994), implementation in iterated deletion of weakly domi-
nated strategies is achieved by one round of removal of weakly dominated strategies followed
by iterative removal of strictly dominated strategies. Since they study the implementation
problem in the environment with more than two players, truthful implementability is auto-
matically satisfied.
6Glazer and Perry (1996) make a simple modification of the normal form mechanism
in Abreu and Matsushima (1992), where the GP mechanism is an extensive form game
with the same outcome function. Nevertheless, the difficulty of modifying the normal form
mechanism in Abreu and Matsushima (1994) is due to their adopting an indication in their
outcome function, for which we know of no counterpart in an extensive form game except
for using the MR mechanism.
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iterated deletion of strictly dominated strategies in Abreu and Matsushima
(1992a) to iterated deletion of weakly dominated strategies. In contrast, we
achieve full implementation in the same solution concept as in Glazer and
Perry (1996), i.e., backward induction.
Glazer and Rubinstein (1996) argue that an extensive-form game provides
a “guide” for solving a normal-form game and thereby reduces the compu-
tational burden on the players. They define a solution concept called guided
iteratively undominated strategies and prove that a social choice function is
implementable in guided iteratively undominated strategies if and only if it is
implementable in subgame-perfect equilibrium in a perfect-information mech-
anism. It follows that our mechanism also implements any truthfully imple-
mentable social choice function in guided iteratively undominated strategies.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the environment.
Section 3 presents the main result and the mechanism. Section 4 provides the
proof, and Section 5 concludes.
1.2 Environment
Let N = {1, 2, ..., n} denote the set of players. The set of pure social alterna-
tives is denoted by A, and ∆ (A) denotes the set of all probability distributions
over A with countable supports. In this context, a ∈ A denotes a pure social
4
alternative and l ∈ ∆ (A) denotes a lottery on A.
For each player i ∈ N , let Θi denote a finite set of types of player i. The
utility index of player i over the set A is denoted by vi : A × Θi → R, where
vi(a, θi) specifies the bounded utility of player i from the social alternative a,
when he is of type θi. Player i’s expected utility from a lottery l ∈ ∆ (A) under
type θi is ui(l, θi) =
∑
a∈A l (a) vi(a, θi), which is well defined since vi(a, θi) is
bounded.
Following Abreu and Matsushima (1992a) and Glazer and Perry (1996),
we assume that (i) for each θi ∈ Θi, vi (·, θi) is not a constant function on A;
and (ii) for any two distinct types θi and θ
′
i, vi(·, θi) is not a positive affine
transformation of vi(·, θ′i). This restriction guarantees the reversal property
which is used to elicit players’ true type (see (1.3)).
A planner aims to implement a social choice function that is a mapping
f : Θ→ ∆ (A), where Θ = Θ1×Θ2×· · ·×Θn.7 We assume that the true type
profile ψ ∈ Θ is commonly known to the players but unknown to the planner.
We assume that the planner can fine or reward a player i ∈ N, and we
denote by ti ∈ R the transfer from player i to the planner. We also assume
that player i’s utility is quasilinear in transfers, and is denoted by ui(l, θi) + ti.
A finite sequential stochastic mechanism is a finite perfect-information game
7Here we follow Abreu and Matsushima (1994) and Glazer and Perry (1996) in assuming
that the space of type profiles is a product space.
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tree Γ together with an outcome function ζ, including an allocation function
g which specifies for each terminal history a lottery l ∈ ∆ (A) and a transfer
rule t = (t1, t2, ..., tn). A sequential mechanism (Γ, ζ) has fines and rewards
bounded by t if |ti| ≤ t for every i ∈ N and every terminal history.
1.3 Mechanism
In this section, we provide a full characterization of social choice function-
s which are fully implemented in backward induction with arbitrarily small
transfers. It is well known that if f is implementable, then it must be truth-
fully implementable. That is, there must exist a “direct revelation mechanism”
f˜ : Θn → ∆ (A) , such that for any θ ∈ Θ, the following hold:
• P1 : f˜ (θn) = f (θ) , i.e., if all individuals announce θ, the outcome is
f (θ) .
• P2 : the unanimous announcement of θ is a Nash equilibrium at state θ.
That is, truth-telling is a Nash equilibrium. Observe that any social choice
function f can then be truthfully implemented when n ≥ 3. This can be
achieved by constructing a direct revelation mechanism with the following
property: if at least n− 1 individuals announce θ, then the outcome is f (θ) .
No individual can change the outcome by deviating from a unanimous an-
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nouncement, so that truth-telling is clearly a Nash equilibrium. The restric-
tion n ≥ 3 is crucial because it allows the planner to identify a deviant from
a truth-telling strategy combination. If instead n = 2 and player 1 announces
θ and player 2, φ, then there is no way for the planner to ascertain whether
state θ has occurred and 2 is lying, or state φ has occurred and 1 is lying.
Clearly, if truth telling is to be sustained as an equilibrium, there must exist
an outcome which is simultaneously no better than f (θ) for 2 in state θ and
no better than f (φ) for 1 in state φ. That is, not every social choice function
is truthfully implementable when n = 2.8
Definition 1.1. A social choice function f is truthfully implementable if there
exists a direct revelation mechanism f˜ which satisfies P1 and P2.
It is well known result that any Nash-implementable social choice function
(even if only partially implementable) must be truthfully implementable (see
Dasgupta et al. (1979)). Proposition 1.1 states that truthful implementabil-
ity is a necessary condition for our notion of implementation which allows
arbitrarily small transfers off equilibrium path.
Proposition 1.1. Assume A is finite. Suppose that for any t > 0, there
exists a finite sequential stochastic mechanism with fines and rewards bounded
8Dutta and Sen (1991) have a detailed discussion in which they provide a full characteriza-
tion of the class of two-person social choice correspondences which are Nash-implementable.
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by t, such that for each type profile ψ, f(ψ) with no transfer is the unique
subgame-perfect equilibrium outcome. Then, f is truthfully implementable.
Proof. For convenience, let t¯ = 1
q
where q ∈ N. Suppose f : Θ → ∆ (A) is
implementable in SPE by a mechanism (Γ, ζ) with fines and rewards bounded
by 1
q
. Let gq be the function which specifies the lottery associated with the
terminal node and let tq be the transfer rule.


























where θi denotes that player i announce θ for any θ ∈ Θ.
Suppose ψ is the true state. Let ψ−i denotes that all the players other than




























Note that this inequality holds for any q and tqi (m) <
1
q
. Since A is finite,











































This completes the proof.
8
Remark 1.1. The compactness of the set of alternatives is to guarantee the
existence of the limit of the bad outcomes as the bound of transfers approaches
zero. If A is compact, our result holds with two technical assumption: (1) ∆(A)
is the set of all probability measure over A; (2) vi(·, θi) is continuous.
Theorem 1.1. For any n ≥ 2, any truthfully implementable social choice
function f , and any t > 0, there exists a finite sequential stochastic mecha-
nism with fines and rewards bounded by t such that for each type profile ψ,
the outcome f(ψ) with no transfer is the unique subgame-perfect equilibrium
outcome.
1.3.1 The preliminaries
Given a social choice function f , since Θi is finite for any i, we let
ξ = max
θi∈Θi,θ,θ′∈Θ,i∈N
|ui(f(θ), θi)− ui(f(θ′), θi)| . (1.1)
That is, ξ is the maximal difference in payoffs of all implementable outcomes
for all players of all types. Choose an integer K and ε > 0 such that
ξ/K < ε < t/6. (1.2)
9
Hence, K is large when t is small. For any distinct types θi and θ
′
i, let xθi,θ′i
and xθ′i,θi be two lotteries such that
ui(xθi,θ′i , θi) > ui(xθ′i,θi , θi);
ui(xθi,θ′i , θ
′
i) < ui(xθ′i,θi , θ
′
i). (1.3)
The existence of xθi,θ′i and xθ′i,θi is guaranteed by the assumption on the pref-
erences. Let L ≡ {xθi,θ′i , xθ′i,θi}θi 6=θ′i,i∈N . Observe that L is a finite set since Θi
and N are both finite.
1.3.2 The Mechanism
The mechanism has K+ 2 rounds. In each round k ≤ K+ 1, the players move
sequentially. Player 1 moves first, player 2 moves second, and so on. In round
k ≤ K, each player i announces a type profile mki ∈ Θ.



















where f˜ satisfies P1 and P2.
Then, by the finiteness of L and Θi, choose pl ∈ (0, 1) such that for any
l′ ∈ L, any i ∈ N, and any θi ∈ Θi,
|ui(l, θi)− ui((1− pl)l + pll′, θi)| < ε/2. (1.4)
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Let
xl,θi,θ′i = (1− pl)l + plxθi,θ′i ;
xl,θ′i,θi = (1− pl)l + plxθ′i,θi .
Consequently, we have
ui(xl,θi,θ′i , θi) > ui(xl,θ′i,θi , θi); (1.5)
ui(xl,θi,θ′i , θ
′
i) < ui(xl,θ′i,θi , θ
′
i).
Remark 1.2. The conditions in (1.5) will guarantee that truth telling is strict-
ly better when players face the constructed lotteries (see the proof of Claim 3.1
in Section 4 below).
In round K + 2, in the order of player n+ 1(≡ 1), n,..., 2, player i has an
opportunity to announce his predecessor’s preference mK+2i ∈ Θi−1 if and only
if mK+2j = m
K+1
j−1 for every j > i.
9
• If mK+2i 6= mK+1i−1 , then player i− 1 chooses xl,mK+1i−1 ,mK+2i or xl,mK+2i ,mK+1i−1
and the game ends;
• If mK+2i = mK+1i−1 , then the game continues and player i − 1 gets the
opportunity to announce his predecessor’s preference mK+2i−1 ∈ Θi−2.
9Note that player 1 always has the opportunity to announce player n’s type.
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If mK+2i = m
K+1
i−1 for all i, then the social alternative is determined by the
lottery l and the game ends.
The transfers are specified as follows:
ti = ηi + τi + δi.
ηi =

−3ε, if mK+2i 6= mK+1i−1 , and i− 1 chooses xl,mK+1i−1 ,mK+2i ;
ε, if mK+2i 6= mK+1i−1 , and i− 1 chooses xl,mK+2i ,mK+1i−1 ;
0, otherwise.
τi =
{ −2ε, if mK+2i+1 6= mK+1i ;
0, otherwise.
δi =
{ −ε, if i is the last person who chooses mki 6= mK+1 for some k ≤ K;
0, otherwise.
Note first that along any history, a player is fined at most 6ε and is rewarded
at most ε, which are bounded by t (by (1.2)). Second, when mK+2i 6= mK+1i−1 ,




; on the other hand, whether i will get ε or −3ε depends on player
i− 1’s choice. We draw the game tree for rounds K + 1 and K + 2 in Figure
1 and highlight the equilibrium path in boldface.
Remark 1.3. The “direct revelation mechanism” f˜ works in the same way
as ρ (a majority rule), used in the GP mechanism.10 With this construction,
we generalize the implementation result in Glazer and Perry (1996) to a two-
10We restate the majority rule from Glazer and Perry (1996, p. 30) as follows:
For each stage k, k = 1, ...,K, a probability of (1−ε)/K is assigned to f (ψ) if mki = ψ, for
at least n− 1 players; otherwise, a probability of (1− ε) /K is assigned to some arbitrarily
chosen alternative b.
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person setting. Note that truthful implementability is trivially satisfied by the
majority rule when there are three or more players. The following corollary
holds immediately if we replace the majority rule in the GP mechanism with
f˜ .
Corollary 1.1. For any n ≥ 2, any truthfully implementable social choice
function f , ε > 0, and t > 0, there exists a finite sequential stochastic mecha-
nism with fines and rewards bounded by t for which the unique subgame-perfect
equilibrium outcome is such that for each type profile ψ, the outcome f(ψ) is
chosen with probability of at least 1− ε.
Remark 1.4. The main difference between our mechanism and the GP mech-
anism is that we adopt a modified MR mechanism to elicit the players’ true
types in round K + 1 and round K + 2. The modified MR mechanism further
differs from the MR mechanism in an essential way: by using randomization,
we can (by (1.4)) make the lottery assigned to each terminal history arbitrarily
close to lottery l, which is determined by the announcements from round 1 to
round K. Consequently, relative to the transfers, the announcement made in
either round K + 1 or round K + 2 has a negligible effect on the lotteries as-
sociated to terminal histories. We can therefore elicit each player’s true type
in round K + 1 without the large transfers required in the MR mechanism.
If we keep the first K rounds identical to the setting in the GP mechanism,
13
we have the following corollary.
Corollary 1.2. For any n ≥ 3, social choice function f , and t > 0, there
exists a finite sequential stochastic mechanism with fines and rewards bounded
by t such that for each type profile ψ, the outcome f(ψ) with no transfer is the
unique subgame-perfect equilibrium outcome.
Remark 1.5. Moore and Repullo (1988) provide a necessary condition for
subgame-perfect implementation for general preferences. The necessary con-
dition is actually indispensable in quasilinear environment which our paper
studies. In their section 5, they construct a simple finite mechanism with per-
fect information in quasilinear environment. With sufficiently large transfers,
this simple mechanism can implement any social choice function (see the de-
tailed discussion on pp. 1214–1215 in Moore and Repullo (1988)). That is,
with large enough transfers, the necessary condition they identify in their The-
orem 1 is automatically satisfied. Our mechanism breaks up the large transfers
into a small scale by adopting a large horizon and making full use of lotteries.
See the detailed discussion in Appendix.
1.4 Implementation
Denote the true type profile by ψ.
14
Claim 1.1. In any subgame-perfect equilibrium where player i moves in round
K+2, player i will announce mK+2i = ψi−1 if m
K+1
i−1 = ψi−1 and will announce
mK+2i 6= mK+1i otherwise.
Proof. First, consider player 2’s choice in round K + 2. This is the last move
in the game tree. There are two cases:
Case 1. mK+11 = ψ1: If player 2 announces m
K+2
2 = ψ1, then l is implemented
and η2 = 0. If, instead, player 2 announces m
K+2
2 6= ψ1, then by (1.5) player
1 will choose xl,mK+11 ,m
K+2
2
, while player 2 will be fined η2 = −3ε. By (1.4),
player 2 will announce ψ1.
Case 2. mK+11 6= ψ1: If player 2 announces mK+22 = mK+11 , then l is imple-
mented and η2 = 0. If, instead, player 2 announces m
K+2
2 = ψ1, then by (1.5)
player 1 will choose xl,mK+22 ,m
K+1
1
, while player 2 will be rewarded with η2 = ε.
By (1.4), player 2 will announce some mK+22 6= mK+11 .
Similarly, since the payoff difference between any two lotteries in the set
{l}∪L is at most ε, each player i (where 2 ≤ i ≤ n) will confirm his predeces-
sor’s announcement in K+1 (i.e., mK+2i = m
K+1
i−1 ) if m
K+1
i−1 = ψi−1; while player
i will challenge his predecessor’s announcement in K + 1 (i.e., mK+2i 6= mK+1i−1 )
if mK+1i−1 6= ψi−1.
Now consider player 1 (i.e., player n+ 1)’s choice in round K + 2. Again,
there are two cases:
15
Case 1. mK+1n = ψn: If player 1 announces m
K+2
1 = ψn, then one outcome
from {l} ∪ L is implemented, η1 = 0, and player 1 will be fined τ1 = −2ε if
he is challenged by player 2 later. In total, the potential loss from announcing
mK+21 = ψn is less than 3ε. If, instead, player 1 announces m
K+2
1 6= ψn, then by
(1.5) player n will choose xl,mK+1n ,mK+21
, while player 1 will be fined η1 = −3ε.
Therefore, player 1 will announce ψn.
Case 2. mK+1n 6= ψn: If player 1 announces mK+21 = mK+1n , then one outcome
from {l}∪L is implemented, η1 = 0. In total, the potential gain from announc-
ing mK+21 = m
K+1
n is less than ε. If, instead, player 1 announces m
K+2
1 = ψn,
then by (1.5) player n will choose xl,mK+21 ,m
K+1
n
, while player 1 will be rewarded
with η1 = ε. Therefore, player 1 will announce some m
K+2
1 6= mK+1n .
Claim 1.2. In any subgame-perfect equilibrium, every player truthfully an-
nounces his own type in round K + 1, i.e., mK+1i = ψi for all i ∈ N .
Proof. Consider player n first. Suppose that player n announces mK+1n 6= ψn.
Since player 1 moves first in roundK+2, then by Claim 3.1, this announcement
will be challenged by player 1 and result in a penalty τn = −2ε. It follows
from (1.4) that by announcing mK+1n 6= ψn, player n’s utility from the induced
lottery is affected by an amount less than ε. In addition, player n potentially
reduces the penalty δn = −ε. Therefore, player n will announce mK+1n = ψn.
Thus, by Claim 3.1, player n will have an opportunity move in round K + 2,
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and by a similar argument, mK+1n−1 = ψn−1. We can inductively argue that
mK+1i = ψi for all i ∈ N.
Claim 1.3. In any subgame-perfect equilibrium, if player i is not the last one
to announce a type profile that is different from mK+1 along a history up to
round k ≤ K, then mki = ψ.
Proof. Note that by Claim 3.3 mK+1 = ψ in any subgame-perfect equilibrium.
Consider player n’s decision in round K. Suppose that player n is not the last
one who lies along a given history. Then, player n will be fined δn = −ε if he
lies by announcing mKn 6= ψ, but will not be fined if he announces mKn = ψ.
The maximal gain from the change in lottery chosen by lying is ξ/K. By (1.2),
he strictly prefers to tell the truth. Inductively we can show that any player
i ≤ n− 1 strictly prefers to tell the truth in round K if player i is not the last
one who lies along a given history.
Suppose that for any player i, he strictly prefers to tell the truth in round
k′ if player i is not the last one who lies along a given history for any k ≤ k′ ≤
K. We show that player i strictly prefers to tell the truth in round k − 1 if
player i is not the last one who lies along a given history for any player i.
If player i lies, then by the induction hypothesis, all the players will tell
the truth in the following histories. Thus, player i will be fined δ1 = −ε. The
maximal gain from the change in lottery chosen by lying is bounded by ξ/K
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in round k. From P2 of f˜ , the maximal gain from the change in lottery chosen
by lying is 0 in round k′′ ≥ k. If he tells the truth, instead of player 1, player
i′ will be fined δi′ = −ε. In total, the potential gain is less than the loss. It
follows that truth-telling is strictly better for player i in round k + 1.
This completes the proof.
Claim 1.4. In any subgame-perfect equilibrium, mki = ψ, for all i ∈ N, and
for all 1 ≤ k ≤ K.
Proof. No player has lied in round k = 1. It then follows from Claim 1.3 that
m1i = ψ for all i. Inductively, m
k
i = ψ for all i ∈ N and for all 1 ≤ k ≤ K.
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1.5 Concluding Remarks
Our result is proved by observing the complementarity between Moore and
Repullo (1988) and Glazer and Perry (1996). Specifically, we modify the MR
mechanism by allowing randomization on the pure outcomes. We can strength-
en the result of Glazer and Perry (1996) to full implementation from virtual
implementation, if we adopt the MR mechanism in the last two rounds, round
K + 1 and round K + 2. In addition, the result of Moore and Repullo (1988)
(which holds with large payments) can be proved with arbitrarily small trans-
fers, if we adopt the idea of Glazer and Perry (1996) (which is due to Abreu
and Matsushima (1992a)) in breaking the large fine into K small pieces.
If there are three or more players, our argument is essentially unaltered
if the fines (resp. rewards) imposed on some player are to be paid to (resp.
paid by) some other player instead of the planner. In other words, with three
or more players, we can achieve budget balance (i.e., the transfers add up to
zero) both on and off the equilibrium path.11
Our result crucially relies on the assumption of complete information and
is therefore subject to the criticism by Aghion et al. (2012), namely, that
our mechanism still admits undesirable sequential equilibria when some in-
11When there are only two players, as in Moore and Repullo (1988), there may be an
additional surplus generated off the equilibrium path.
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formation perturbation (as defined in Aghion et al. (2012)) is introduced to
the complete-information environment. An extension of our analysis to an
incomplete-information environment is left for future research.12
The finiteness of the mechanism relies crucially on the assumption that the
state space is finite. We cannot hope for a finite mechanism to fully implement
any social choice function when the state space is infinite. In addition, the
finiteness assumption guarantees the existence of lotteries to elicit the true
preference of each player. This is crucial for our result as well as for the
results in Abreu and Matsushima (1992a), Abreu and Matsushima (1994),
and Glazer and Perry (1996).
12Instead of using dynamic mechanisms, Chen et al. (2014) use a finite static mechanism
to show that, in incomplete information environments, any truthfully implementable so-
cial choice function is implementable in one round deletion of weakly dominated strategies















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































In this section, we restate the necessary condition, i.e., Condition C, in The-
orem 1 of Moore and Repullo (1988) and show that Condition C is trivially
satisfied in qusilinear environment. We incorporate their setting into our en-
vironment. In this section, f is a social choice correspondence from Θ to
∆(A).
Condition C For each pair of profiles θ and φ in Θ, and for each a ∈ f (θ)
but a 6∈ f (φ) , there exists a finite sequence
a (θ, φ; a) ≡ {a0 = a, a1, ..., ak, ..., ah = x, ah+1 = y} ⊂ A,
with h = h (θ, φ; a) ≥ 1, such that:
(1) for each k = 0, ..., h−1, there is some particular agent j (k) = j (k|θ, φ; a) ,
say, for whom
uj(k)(ak, θ) ≥ uj(k)(ak+1, θ); and
(2) there is some particular agent j (h) = j (h|θ, φ; a) , say, for whom
uj(h) (x, θ) ≥ uj(h) (y, θ) and uj(h) (y, φ) > uj(h) (x, φ) .
Further, h (θ, φ; a) is uniformly bounded by some h¯ <∞.
We first show that with sufficiently large transfers, Condition C is auto-
matically satisfied in qusilinear environment.
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To see Condition C is trivially satisfied when large enough transfers are
allowed, we consider a pair of states {(θi, θ−i) , (θ′i, θ−i)} and a ∈ f (θi, θ−i) but
a 6∈ f (θ′i, θ−i) .
Since the state space is finite, there exist a pair of outcomes x, y ∈ ∆ (A)
and a pair of transfers tx, ty ∈ R, such that
ui (x, θi)− tx > ui (y, θi)− ty,
ui (x, θ
′
i)− tx < ui (y, θ′i)− ty. (1.6)
Furthermore, ui (a, θi) > ui (a
′, θi) − t, for all θi ∈ Θi, all a′ ∈ ∆ (A) and for
any t ∈ {tx, ty}.
Now, let the finite sequence be
a (θ, φ; a) ≡ {a0 = a, a1 = {x, tx} , a2 = {y, ty}} .
Let j (0) = j (1) = i. We have
ui (a, θi) > ui (x, θi)− tx > ui (y, θi)− ty
that is, (1) in Condition C holds; morever, (2) follows from (1.6).
We show that we can make use of lotteries to decrease the large payments
into an arbitrarily small scale.
Recall that for any distinct types θi and θ
′




ui(xθi,θ′i , θi) > ui(xθ′i,θi , θi);
ui(xθi,θ′i , θ
′








(1− pa)a+ paxθi,θ′i , θi
)− t > ui((1− pa)a+ paxθ′i,θi , θi)− t;
ui((1− pa)a+ paxθi,θ′i , θ′i)− t < ui
(
(1− pa)a+ paxθ′i,θi , θ′i
)− t.
In our mechanism, the finite sequence is






Consider a society consisting of a group of individuals. Assume that this soci-
ety agrees upon some social choice rule (or welfare criterion) as a mapping from
states to outcomes where each state can be interpreted as the relevant informa-
tion needed to pin down desirable outcomes at that state. Then, the theory of
implementation and mechanism design poses the following institutional design
question: what class of social choice rules can be realized by mechanisms (in-
stitutions)? The answer to this question precisely relies on how we hypothesize
about the following two ingredients: (1) what class of mechanisms are we al-
lowed to use? (2) how does each agent behave in the mechanism? It is already
well known in the literature that one can obtain very permissive implementa-
tion results by using dynamic (or sequential) mechanisms and exploiting the
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assumption of complete information. In complete information environments,
Moore and Repullo (1988) construct a dynamic mechanism (henceforth, the
MR mechanism) that implements “any” social choice rule as the unique sub-
game perfect equilibrium.
Subgame perfect implementation is particularly successful because it shows
that most desirable outcomes are in fact uniquely implementable as subgame
perfect equilibria. Nevertheless, there remain several criticisms: (1) It relies
excessively on the agents’ rationality. For deviations are always considered to
be “one-shot deviations from rationality” that do not shatter the faith players
have in the subsequent rationality of their opponents; (2) The punishment of
all agents is often needed out of the equilibrium in the mechanism and this is
clearly not in their collective interest: what if the agents decided to abandon
the original mechanism after a Pareto inefficient outcome is realized as an out-
of-equilibrium outcome and they renegotiate this into a new Pareto efficient
outcome? (3) The introduction of even small information perturbations greatly
reduces the power of subgame perfect implementation. Aghion, Fudenberg,
Holden, Kunimoto, and Tercieux (2012, henceforth, AFHKT) show that under
arbitrarily small information perturbations the MR mechanism does not yield
(even approximately) truthful revelation and that in addition the mechanism
has sequential equilibria with undesirable outcomes.
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The main objective of this paper is to provide very permissive robust im-
plementation results via dynamic mechanisms. More specifically, this paper
proposes a two-stage mechanism which (1) has a unique truth-telling sequential
equilibrium in pure strategies that is robust to any “private-value perturba-
tion”; (2) is dominance-solvable in the weakest notion of “sequential ratio-
nalizability”; (3) is immune to renegotiation. Before getting into the details,
from the outset, we want to be clear about the domain of problems to which
our results apply. First, we consider environments where monetary transfers
among the players are available and all players have quasilinear utilities in
money. We focus on this class of environments because most of the settings in
the applications of mechanism design are in economies with money. Second,
we employ the stochastic mechanisms in which lotteries are explicitly used.
Therefore, we assume that each player has von Neumann and Morgenstern ex-
pected utility. Third, we focus on private values environments. That is, each
player’s utility depends only upon his own payoff type as well as the lottery
chosen and his monetary payment.
In a dynamic mechanism, agents could have multiple beliefs, one at each
information set. These beliefs are updated via Bayes’ rule whenever possi-
ble; however, if an agent is surprised by a zero-probability event, Bayesian
updating does not apply and the agent needs to revise her belief in another
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fashion. The assumption on how this belief revision proceeds is precisely what
distinguishes different existing solution concepts for dynamic games. Sub-
game perfection equilibrium entails backwards induction, which requires that
there be rationality and common belief in rationality at “every” information
set. This means that under backwards induction, each agent always attributes
any out-of-equilibrium behavior of the opponents to mere mistakes and main-
tains her initial hypothesis of rationality and common belief in rationality in
the subsequent stages of the game. Following Ben-Porath (1997), Dekel and
Siniscalchi (2013) introduce the concept of initial rationalizability, which we
take as this paper’s solution concept in extensive form games. Initial ratio-
nalizability is like rationalizability in normal-form games in that it iteratively
deletes strategies that are not best replies. Unlike backwards induction, initial
rationalizaiblity only requires that there be rationality and common belief in
rationality “at the beginning of the game.” Accommodating any belief revision
assumption at any subsequent stages of the game after a zero-probability event
occurs, we acknowledge that initial rationalizability is the weakest rationalaiz-
ability concept among all in extensive-form games. Hence, implementation
under initial rationalizability is the most robust concept of implementation
among the existing concepts for implementation in dynamic mechanisms.
Our first result shows that one can construct a two-stage mechanism which
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implements any social choice function under initial rationalizability. The re-
quirement of initial rationalizable implementation can be decomposed into the
following two parts: (1) there always exists an initial rationalizable strategy
profile whose outcome coincides with the given rule; (2) there are no initial
rationalizable strategy profile whose outcomes differ from those of the rule.
Since complete information entails common knowledge of states, which is
very demanding and at best taken to be a simplifying assumption, it is a sen-
sible exercise to ask for the robustness of the implementation results to small
amounts of incomplete information. To pursue this line of research, we are
motivated by the approach of Chung and Ely (2003), who consider the fol-
lowing scenario: if a planner is concerned that all equilibria of his mechanism
yield a desired outcome, and entertains the possibility that players may have
even the slightest uncertainty about payoffs, then the planner should insist
on a solution concept with closed graph. Specifically, our second result shows
that it is possible to construct a finite two-stage mechanism which not only
fully implements any social choice function under complete information but
also does so in all the nearby environments. Therefore our result generates the
following important corollary: any social choice function is implementable for
all types in the model under study and it continues to be implementable for
all types “close” to this initial model. Therefore, any social choice function
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is continuously implementable in dynamic mechanism where the concept of
continuity here is the same as the one proposed by Oury and Tercieux (2012).
This robustness result still holds if we instead adopt other solution concept-
s such as subgame perfect equilibrium, subgame rationalizability (Bernheim
(1984)), and extensive form rationalizability (Pearce (1984)) because these are
simply the refinements of initial rationalizability.
Our results narrow several open questions in the literature. First, we con-
tribute to the literature of rationalizable implementation. Bergemann, Morris,
and Tercieux (2011) investigate the implications of rationalizable implemen-
tation by employing infinite, static, stochastic mechanisms. They show that
strict Maskin monotonicity is a necessary condition. Note that Maskin mono-
tonicity is known to be a necessary condition for Nash implementation.1 Moore
(1992) proposes a simple sequential mechanism where every player moves only
once. His result does not rely excessively on the agents’ rationality, since even
when some player is surprised by his opponent’s behavior, it does not matter
whether he believes the one who surprised him is rational or not. However,
there is a cost associated with it: his simple sequential mechanism needs large
size of monetary penalties and this mechanism works only under a stringent
condition on the environment. Moore (1992) argues that the most natural
1See Maskin (1999) for this.
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examples where his simple mechanism works are either only one of the two
players has a state dependent preference, or both of their preferences are per-
fectly correlated. Clearly, the applicability of his result is very limited. On the
other hand, we obtain a very permissive implementation result in much more
general environments: any social choice function is fully implementable under
initial rationalizability by a finite dynamic mechanism.
Second, we contribute to the literature of the robustness of the implemen-
tation results to almost complete information. For instance, Chung and Ely
(2003) investigate the robustness of undominated Nash implementation and
AFHKT (2012) investigate the robustness of subgame perfect implementation.
Exploiting “interdependent” values perturbations, they both conclude that
Maskin monotonicity is a necessary condition for their robust implementation.
We investigate the robustness of implementation under initial rationalizaibili-
ty. Our result shows that any social choice function is robustly implementable
under “private” values perturbations. As shown by Qin and Yang (2013), the
perturbations in Chung and Ely (2003) and AFHKT (2012) are both consider
as order two perturbation; in contrast, our positive result extends to any high
order perturbation in universal type space.
Third, we contribute to the literature of implementation with renegotiation.
We sometimes interpret a mechanism as a contract between the agents. In
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this case, they will presumably choose a mechanism that will deliver a Pareto
efficient outcome in equilibrium. Suppose, for whatever the reason may be,
that play of the mechanism results in an out-of-equilibrium outcome and this
outcome is not Pareto efficient. Then, it is very likely that the agents tear up
the contract and negotiate a new Pareto efficient outcome. To prevent this
type of ex post renegotiation, Maskin and Tirole (1999) consider the buyer-
seller bilateral trading model and assume that the agents sign a contract that
uses a stochastic transfer from the seller to the buyer when out-of-equilibrium
outcome is realized. If the buyer is risk-averse, then this fine can be designed
so that it hurts both the seller and the buyer. However, this construction
does not work for risk-neutral parties. If parties are close to risk-neutral, the
stochastic fine that is required needs to have a very large variance, which is not
very credible as it will violate the wealth constraints. Thus the applicability
of their result is doubtful in this case. Our mechanism adopts the idea of
Abreu and Matsushima (1992) to transform the required large payments into
arbitrarily small scale. This makes our mechanism a lot more reasonable than
that of Maskin and Tirole (1999).
Fourth, we contribute to the literature of the hold-up problem. It is often
the case that, when two parties engage in a relationship, they are uncertain
about the values of some parameter which will affect their future payoffs. This
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uncertainty is represented by a set of parameters that take several values.
Although they will both learn the value of the parameter in the future, they
cannot write ex ante contracts contingent on the state of nature because this
state of nature is not verifiable by a third party. When two parties sign an
ex ante contract based on some parameter which will be realized ex post but
not verifiable by a third party, it might entail transaction cost (Williamson
(1975)). However, the mechanism we develop here can be used to ensure that
truthful revelation occurs in equilibrium. Therefore the unverifiability alone
does not create any transaction cost.
Our paper is also related to the literature motivated by King Solomon’s
dilemma. Qin and Yang (2009) provide a two-stage dynamic mechanism to
implement the social desired allocation in one round deletion of weakly dom-
inated strategy followed by iterative deletion of strictly dominated strategies.
They allow the information is incomplete among players and use an infinite
mechanism (the second stage they adopt second price auction to elicit players’
true type). When we focus the complete information environment, we can
adopt a much weaker solution to achieve the social desired allocation. The
common feature is that both their mechanism and ours are robust to private
value perturbations.
The robust dynamic implementation literature is also closely related to
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our work. Mu¨ller (2013b) studies robust virtual implementation using dy-
namic mechanism under common strong belief in rationality. Mu¨ller (2013a)
adopts the same solution as ours to study robust dynamic implementation.
The difference between the robustness notion and ours is that instead of pur-
suing a mechanism to work in any type space, we focus on the bench mark
type space and consider the class of type space around it.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 uses a simple
buyer-seller example to introduce the MR mechanism and the general criticism
on it. Then within the same example, we construct a two-stage mechanism
which is immune to many of the criticisms. In Section 3, we introduce the
preliminary notation and definitions. Section 4 provides our main results.
More specifically, we establish Theorem 1 for implementation under initial
rationalizability (Section 4.1); Theorem 2 for robust implementation to small
perturbations around the benchmark model (Section 4.2); Corollary 1 for the
robust implementation to small perturbations around complete information;
and Theorem 3 for implementation with arbitrarily small transfers (Section
4.3). In Section 5 we discuss several issues. First, we show that it is possible
to provide a perfect information mechanism based on the MR mechanism that
not only implements any social choice function under complete information
but also does so in all the nearby environments. However, the implementation
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under information perturbations is successful only if the players adopt mixed
strategies in the unique sequential equilibrium. This casts doubt on how the
MR mechanism being played by the real people because it is not cognitively
simple at all for a player to play mixed strategies. Finally, we propose a way
of making the transfer rule satisfying budget balance when there are at least
three individuals.
2.2 Illustration
To illustrate the main idea of this paper, we consider the following simple ex-
ample adapted from Hart and Moore (2003). There are two parties, a B(uyer)
and a S(eller) of a single unit of an indivisible good. If trade occurs then B’s
payoff is
VB = θ − p,
where p is the price and θ is the good’s quality. S’s payoff is
VS = p,
thus we normalize the cost of producing the good to zero.
The good can be of either high or low quality. If it is high quality then B
values it at θH = 14, and if it is low quality then B values it at θL = 10. We
seek to implement the social choice function f ∗ whereby the good is always
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traded ex post, and where the buyer always pays the true value of θ to the
seller.
2.2.1 Moore-Repullo Mechanism
Suppose first that the quality θ is observable and common knowledge to both
parties. The implementation of f ∗ can be achieved through the following
Moore-Repullo (MR) mechanism:
(1) B announces either a “high” or “low” quality. If B announces “high”
then B pays S a price equal to 14 in exchange of the good and the game
stops.
(2) If B announces “low” and S does not “challenge” B’s announcement, then
B pays a price equal to 10 and the game stops.
(3) If S challenges B’s announcement then:
(a) B pays a fine F = 9 to T (a third party)
(b) B is offered the good for 6
(c) If B accepts the good then S receives F from T (and also a payment
of 6 from B) and the game stops.
(d) If B rejects at 3b then S pays F to T .

































Figure 2.1: The left is under θH and the right is under θL. The equilibrium
path is in boldface.
The game specified by the MR mechanism under different values are shown
in Figure 1. The MR mechanism is extremely successful because it shows
that most desirable outcomes are in fact implementable as a unique subgame-
perfect equilibrium. However, the way MR mechanism delivers such a good
performance is subject to several criticisms. First, the solution concept of
backwards induction relies excessively on the assumption of common belief of
rationality. For deviations are always considered to be “one-shot deviations
from rationality” that do not shatter the faith players have in the subsequent
rationality of their opponents (see Reny (1992), Ben-Porah (1997) and Bat-
tigali and Siniscalchi (1999) for more details on the criticisms on backwards
induction). Second, the punishment of all agents is often needed out of the
equilibrium in the mechanism and this is clearly not in their collective inter-
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est. This feature is particularly problematic if the agents can decide ex post
to abandon the original mechanism after a Pareto inefficient outcome is real-
ized as an out-of-equilibrium outcome so that they can renegotiate for a new
Pareto efficient outcome (see Laffont and Martimort (2002) and Bolton and
Dewatripont (2005) for the detailed discussion on renegotiation). Third, the
introduction of even small information perturbations greatly reduces the pow-
er of subgame perfect implementation. In particular, AFHKT (2012) show
that under arbitrarily small information perturbations, the MR mechanism
does not yield (even approximately) truthful revelation and that in addition,
the mechanism has sequential equilibria with undesirable outcomes.
The first two criticisms are well known and we see no strong reason to
illustrate them. However, we would like to illustrate the issues that come the
last criticism. To do so, we first make a brief review of AFHKT (2012). Players
have imperfect information about θ, which is generated from a common prior
µ with µ (θH) = 1−α and µ (θL) = α for some α ∈ (0, 1) . Each player receives
a draw from a signal structure with two possible signals sh or sl, where sh is a
high signal that is associated with θH , and s
l is a low signal associated with θL.
We use the notation sB = s
h
B (resp. sB = s
l
B) to refer to the event in which
B receives the high signal sh (resp. the low signal sl) and similar notation
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θL 0 0 0 α
























αε α (1− ε− ε2)
Note that as ε converges to 0, the marginal probability distribution of νε on
θ coincides with µ. That is, each player’s signal is almost correct under νε. The
second feature of νε is that when the agents receive different signals, B’s signal
becomes infinitely more accurate than S’s. This implies that when S and B
were informed of the signal, and the signals disagree, they will conclude that
with high probability the true state corresponds to B’s signal. This matters a
lot when S decides whether to challenge B.
AFHKT (2012) first show that truth telling cannot be (even approximately)
an equilibrium in pure strategies. This is easy to see in the previous example:
if S does not challenge when observing low signal, B would like to announce
“low” regardless of the signal he received. They also show that even allowing
for mixed strategies, the probability of truthful announcement never goes to 1
as ε goes to 0 (see Proposition 1 in AFHKT (2012) for details). Furthermore,
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under this information structure, there exists a persistently bad sequential
equilibrium. Suppose that B always announces “high” regardless of the signal
received. S always challenges when observing “low” regardless of her signal
too. In the last stage, B accepts the offer when his signal is high, and rejects
it otherwise. B holds his posterior belief given his private information and the
initial prior. We specify the following belief system at the last stage of the
game: S believes with probability 1 that B received high signal. Sequential
rationality is easy to check with this belief system, which is also consistent
indeed.
2.2.2 Two-Stage Mechanism
We will provide a sequential mechanism that implements the social choice func-
tion f ∗ under complete information. We also show that f ∗ is implementable
under all the nearby environments. We define the mechanism as follows.
(1) Both B and S announce “high” or “low” simultaneously. If both of them
announce “high” then B pays S a price equal to 14 in exchange of the
good and the game stops; if both of them announce “low” then B pays
S a price equal to 10 in exchange of the good and the game stops.
(2) If B announces differently from S’s announcement then:
(a) B pays a fine F = 9 to T (a third party).
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(b) B is offered the good for the price of 6.
(c) If B accepts the good, then S receives F from T (and also a payment
of 6 from B) and the game stops.
(d) If B rejects the offer made at 2 (b), then S pays F to T.
(e) B and S each get the item with probability 1/2 and the game stops.
θH , θH θH , θL


















Figure 2.2: The payoff is specified by the mechanism under θH .
First, we focus on complete information environments. The game specified
by two-stage mechanism under θH is shown in Figure 2. Since B is the sole
player in the second stage, knowing the state is high, he will accept the offer.





shB 0, 14 −1,−9
slS −1, 15 0, 10
Apparently, announcing high is a strictly dominant strategy for S. Knowing
this, B will announce high too. Similarly, when the state is low, S and B will
coordinate on low.
There is only one active player, B, in the second stage and B’s choice
only depends on her own type. This structure delivers a lot of advantages
over the existing mechanisms. First, we discuss the agents’ rationality in this
mechanism. Although the active player might be surprised by other players’
moves in the previous history, he will play in a rational way. Then, we can
show that when we adopt the solution which requires only rationality and
initial common belief of rationality, the outcome still coincides with the one
induced by subgame perfect equilibrium.
Second, we discuss the role of information perturbations. As long as the
active player almost knows his own payoff type (recall also that the buyer has
infinitely more accurate information than the seller) then it will not change the
outcome from subgame perfect equilibrium as well. Finally, all the payments
needed out of the equilibrium in this mechanism can be reduced to arbitrarily
small scale by adopting the idea from Abreu and Matsushima (1992), the
details of which will be discussed in Section 2.6.
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The key insights of this two-stage mechanism is as follows. First, we merge
the first two stages in the MR mechanism into one. This prevents the informa-
tion leakage from the buyer to the seller, which is the very reason that the MR
is not robust to even small information perturbations (see AFHKT (2012)). S-
ince S will not be influenced by whatever B announces, she will make decisions
based on his own posterior belief, which is almost accurate when information
is almost complete. Second, there is only one active player in the last stage.
This construction makes the mechanism work with the least requirement of
the active player. B chooses his type based on his own rationality no matter
how he is surprised by S’s previous choice. When the information structure
is only slightly perturbed, since we consider the perturbation where B almost
knows his own type regardless of what signal received by S, B will behave in
the same way regardless of whether he knows S’s signal or not.
The mechanism can be generalized to the environments where there are
I players and each player has J types. Our mechanism is still a two-stage
mechanism, while the MR mechanism needs I phases, which has 3I stages in
total. To avoid some technical details involved in more general mechanisms,




Let I denote a finite set of players and with abuse of notation, we denote by
I the cardinality of I. Assume also that I ≥ 2. The set of simple lotteries
over an arbitrary set of outcomes is denoted by A. We assume that players’
values are private. That is, the utility index of player i over the set A is
denoted by a bounded utility function ui : A×Θi → R, where Θi is the finite
set of payoff types and ui(a, θi) specifies the utility of player i from the social
alternative a ∈ A under θi ∈ Θi. We assume that any two distinct types θi and
θ
′
i induce different preference orders over A and there is no total indifference
over the outcomes under any θi. We abuse notation to use ui(x, θi) as player i’s
expected utility from a lottery x ∈ ∆ (A) under θi. We also assume that player
i’s utility is quasilinear in transfers, denoted by ui(x, θi) + τi where τi ∈ R.
Lemma 2.1. (Abreu and Matsushima (1992)) For each i ∈ I, there exists a
function xi : Θi → A such that for any θi, θ′i ∈ Θi with θi 6= θ′i,
ui (xi (θi) , θi) > ui (xi (θ
′
i) , θi) .
Let u = supi,a,θi ui(a, θi) be a uniform upper bound of all players’ utility
functions. Similarly, let u be a uniform lower bound of all players’ utility
functions. We can choose a large enough money D ∈ R+ such that, D > u−u.
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Until the end of Section 2.5, we assume that the true type profile θ∗ ∈ Θ
is commonly known to the players but unknown to the planner. This is what
we mean by complete information environments. We consider a planner who
aims to implement a social choice function f : Θ → A. We assume that the
planner can fine or reward a player i ∈ I and denote by τi the transfer from the
planner to player i. Throughout the paper, we define a dynamic mechanism
as a multistage with observed actions, which means that at each history h,
all players know the entire history of the play, and if more than one player
moves at h, they do so simultaneously. The class of mechanisms we consider
in the present paper is exactly the same as the one AFHKT (2012) allowed. A
dynamic mechanism is then an extensive game form Γ = (H,M,Z, g) where
(1) H is the set of all histories; (2) M = ×i∈IMi,Mi = ×h∈HMi(h) for all i ∈ I
where Mi(h) denotes the set of available messages for i at history h; (3) Z
describes the history that immediately follows history h given that the strategy
profile m has been played; and (4) g is the outcome function that maps the
set of terminal histories into the set of lotteries ∆ (A) with a transfer profile
τ = (τ1, τ2, ..., τI).
Let Γ(θ) denote an extensive form game associated with dynamic mecha-
nism Γ at state θ. Let σi : Θi → Mi be a strategy of player i. Let Σi denote
the set of strategies of player i and Σ = ×i∈IΣi denote the set of strategy
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profiles. A solution concept is a correspondence S : Θ⇒ Σ as a mapping from
states to a subset of strategies. The outcome correspondence associated with
a solution S is a mapping OS from Θ to A× RI with the following property:
OS(θ)) =
{
(a, τ) ∈ A× RI |∃ m ∈ S(Γ(θ)) s.t. g (m) = (a, τ)} for each θ ∈ Θ.
We say that a mechanism Γ implements a social choice function f via
a solution concept S, if OS(θ)) = f(θ) for all θ ∈ Θ. Then, f is said to
be implementable via the solution S if there exists a mechanism Γ which
implements it via the solution S.
2.3.2 Mechanism
We shall construct a two stage finite dynamic mechanism and call it Γ∗.
The outcome
Let 1 = I + 1.
First Stage: Each player i announces a pair of types, his own and player








where m0i ∈M0i = Θi and m1i ∈M1i = Θi−1. We write m1 = (m1i )i∈I .
If m0i = m
1
i+1, for all i ∈ I, then f (m1) is implemented. STOP. Otherwise,
we proceed to the Second Stage.
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Second Stage: Let i∗ = min1≤i≤I
{
i ∈ I|m0i 6= m1i+1
}
. Player i∗ announces
one of his types, that is,
m2i∗ ∈M2i∗ = Θi∗ ,
and xi∗ (m
2
i∗) is implemented. STOP. Recall that xi∗ : Θi∗ → A is
constructed as in Lemma 1.
The transfer rule
The transfers are specified as follows:
• Player i∗ pays a penalty (I + 1− i∗)×D.
• If m1i∗+1 = m2i∗ then player i∗ + 1 gets a reward (I + 1− i∗)×D;
• if m1i∗+1 6= m2i∗ then player i∗ + 1 pays a penalty (I + 1− i∗)×D.
This two-stage mechanism is quite simple. In the first stage, each player i
announces a pair of types in the first stage, his own type and his predecessor’s
type (i − 1’s). For player i’s type, if i’s own announcement about his type is
the same as his successor (i+1)’s announcement about i (i.e., m0i = m
1
i+1), we
say this player’s announcement is consistent. If every player’s announcement
is consistent, then we implement f(m1).
Otherwise, we have a nonempty set of players whose announcements are
not consistent. We pick the smallest index of this set of players, denoted by
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i∗ who is the sole active player at the second stage and makes an additional
choice over the set of lotteries {xi∗(θi)}θi∈Θi . Then the lottery based on his
choice is implemented.
The transfers in this mechanism is specified in a straightforward way. First,
player i∗ is penalized by (I + 1− i∗)D because he is the smallest index which
exhibits an inconsistent announcement. Second, whether player i∗ + 1 is pe-
nalized or rewarded depends upon his announcement about i∗ (i.e., m1i∗+1) and
player i∗’s second stage announcement (i.e., m2i∗): if player i
∗+1 made the same
announcement for i∗ as i∗’s second stage announcement (i.e., m1i∗+1 = m
2
i∗),
player i∗+1 will be rewarded by (I+1− i∗)D; if player i∗+1 made a different
announcement from i∗’s second stage announcement (i.e., m1i∗+1 6= m2i∗), player
i∗ + 1 will be penalized by (I + 1− i∗)D.
The size of the transfer is designed in a decreasing way with respect to the
index, while the priority of being player i∗ is given to the smaller index. This
construction will prevent players from triggering or not triggering the second
stage with the intention that he will be involved in the pair at the later stage.
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2.4 Complete information
2.4.1 Solution and implementation
A mechanism Γ together with a type profile θ defines a two-stage game denoted
by Γ (θ). The game proceeds as follows. At the initial history ∅, each player
chooses a message mi from his message space Mi (∅) = Θi × Θi−1, and we
write m for the message profile obtained at the first stage. Given any m,
there are two possibilities: (1) the game ends; (2) or the game proceeds to the
second stage, where there is a unique player “i∗”, who makes a choice out of
his message space, Mi∗ (m) = Θi∗ . Let M [i] denote the set of histories after
which player i is picked as the unique player “i∗”. We write m [i] ∈M [i] , and
Mi (m [i]) = Θi for all m [i] ∈M [i] .
Formally, each player’s strategy is a function




where σi (∅) =
{
σii (∅) , σi−1i (∅)
} ∈ Mi (∅) = Θi × Θi−1 and σi (m [i]) ∈
Mi (m [i]) = Θi. Given Γ (θ) , conditional on history h ∈ H, player i’s payoff
from a strategy profile σ is given by
vi (σ, θi|h) = ui (g(σ(θ);h), θi) + τi (σ(θ)) .
In particular, conditional on m [i] (a history where i’s the player i∗), player i’s
payoff from a strategy σi is given by
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+ τi (m [i]) .
In order to analyze players’ reasoning at each point in the game, it is neces-
sary to adopt a model of conditional beliefs. Following Ben-Porath (1997) (see
also Battigalli and Siniscalchi, 1999), we adopt the following notion, originally
proposed by Renyi (1955).
Definition 2.1. Fix a measurable space (Ω,X ) and a countable collection
B ⊂ X . A conditional probability system, or CPS, is a map µ : X ×B → [0, 1]
such that:
1. For each B ∈ B, µ (·|B) ∈ ∆ (Ω) and µ (B|B) = 1.
2. If A ∈ Σ and B,C ∈ B with B ⊂ C, then µ (A|C) = µ (A|B) · µ (B|C) .
The set of CPSs on (Ω,Σ) with conditioning events B is denoted ∆B (Ω) .
Let B−i a collection of Σ−i and Ω = Σ−i. Due to the simplicity of the two
stage game, this is enough to characterize any conditional belief system.
Note that the unique active player after the first stage makes his choice
purely based on his own payoff type. Therefore, what kind of initial belief he
holds has nothing to do with his choice, as long as he knows his own payoff
type. This point is straightforward in the following definition. This will be
clear when we introduce the details of our mechanism.
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Definition 2.2. (Sequential Rationality) Fix a player i ∈ I, a CPS µ ∈
∆B−i (Σ−i) and a strategy σi ∈ Σi. Say that σi is a sequential best response to
µ iff, for all σ′i ∈ Σi, for all h ∈ H,
∑
σ−i





i, σ−i) , θi|h)µ [σ−i|Σ−i] .
We represent the definition of initial rationalizability given by Dekel and
Siniscalchi (2013). The epistemic foundation is rationality and initial common
belief of rationality, which is provided by Ben-Porath (1997) to study perfect
information games. The solution can be characterized via an iterative dele-
tion algorithm in Battigalli and Siniscalchi (1999) which deals with general
multistage games.
Definition 2.3. (Initial Rationalizability) Fix a multistage game Γ (θ) . For
every player i ∈ I, let RΓ(θ)i,0 = Σi. Inductively, for every integer k > 0, let
R
Γ(θ)
i,k be the set of strategies σi ∈ Σi that are sequential best replies to a CPS






= 1. Finally, the set of initially







Definition 2.4. A social choice function f is implementable in initial ra-
tionalizable strategies if there exists a mechanism Γ such that, for all θ and
m ∈M , RΓ(θ) 6= ∅ and m ∈ RΓ(θ) ⇒ g (m) = f (θ) .
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2.4.2 Main result
Theorem 2.1. If I ≥ 2, any social choice function f is implementable in
initial rationalizable strategies.
We use the following claims to prove Theorem 2.1.
Claim 2.1. If σi ∈ RΓ(θ)i,1 , then σi (m [i]) = θi.
Proof. From Lemma 2.1,
ui (xi (θi) , θi) + τi (m [i]) > ui (xi (θ
′
i) , θi) + τi (m [i]) ,
for any θ′i 6= θi.
As the game proceeds to the second stage, the outcome of the game purely
depends on player i∗’s choice. From the construction of the mechanism, the
transfers to (or from) player i∗ is regardless of his choice and the choice of
player i∗ is purely over his own payoff types. The Lemma 2.1 guarantees that
every player i will truthfully reveals his own payoff type whenever i = i∗.
Claim 2.2. If σ2 ∈ RΓ(θ)2,2 , then σ12 (∅) = θ1.










µ12 (σ1 (m [1]) = θi|Σ−2) = 1
.(We write µji for i’s belief over Σj, µi for i’s belief over Σ−i.)
Consider the following two cases:
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Case 2.1 (σ11 (∅) = θ1). If σ12 (∅) 6= θ1, then the game proceeds to the second
stage and player 1 is the player i∗. From Claim 2.1, player 1 will announce
θ1 in the second stage. Since σ
1
2 (∅) 6= σ1 (m [1]) , player 2 gets punished by
nD and the outcome is x1 (θ1) . If σ
1
2 (∅) = θ1, the game will proceed in the
following possible ways: (1) Player 2 is the player i∗. Player 2 gets punished
by (I − 1)D and the outcome is x2 (θ2) . (2) Player 2 is not the player i∗ and
player 2 gets neither reward nor penalty and the outcome is in A.
In case (1), for player 2, consider {ID, x1 (θ1)} and {(I − 1)D, x2 (θ2)} ,
the potential gain from the different outcomes is bounded by the loss from the
different penalties by the construction of D. That is, player 2 gets strictly better
since the penalty is less. In case (2), it is straightforward that player 2 gets
strictly better since he avoids the penalty.
Case 2.2 (σ11 (∅) 6= θ1). If σ12 (∅) = θ1, the game proceeds to the second stage
and from Claim 2.1 player 2 gets rewarded by nD and the outcome is x1 (θ1) .
This is uniquely the best player 2 can expect in this game by the construction
of D. Obviously, any announcement of player 1’s type rather than θ1 delivers
a strictly worse payoff to player 2.
Therefore, for player 2, it is a strictly dominated strategy to announce
player 1’s type, θ1.
This completes the proof of Claim 2.
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Claim 2.3. If σ1 ∈ RΓ(θ)1,3 , then σ11 (∅) = θ1.
Proof. If σ1 ∈ RΓ(θ)1,3 , then µ21 (σ12 (∅) = θ1|Σ−1) = 1. If σ11 (∅) 6= θ1, then the
game proceeds to the second stage and player 1 is the player i∗. Player 1 gets
punished by nD and the outcome is x1 (θ1) . If σ
1
1 (∅) = θ1, the game will
proceed in the following possible ways: (1) Player I is the player i∗. The worst
situation for player 1 is that player 1 gets punished by D the outcome is xI (θI) .
This happens when I is the player i∗ and player 1 announces σI1 (∅) 6= θI ; (2)
Player I is not the player i∗. Thus player 1 gets neither reward nor penalty.
Clearly, in either case, player 1 gets strictly better if he announces θ1 rather
than any other type.
Claim 2.4. If σi+1 ∈ RΓ(θ)i+1,2(i−1), then σii+1 (∅) = θi; if σi ∈ RΓ(θ)i,2(i−1)+1, then
σii (∅) = θi.
Proof. We have established Claims 2.2 and 2.3. By induction, it suffices to
show if “If σi+1 ∈ RΓ(θ)i+1,2(i−1), then σii+1 (∅) = θi; if σi ∈ RΓ(θ)i,2(i−1)+1, then
σii (∅) = θi.” is true for all i ≤ j, then “If σj+2 ∈ RΓ(θ)j+2,2j, then σj+1j+2 (∅) = θj+1;
if σj+1 ∈ RΓ(θ)j,2j+1, then σj+1j+1 (∅) = θj+1.” is true.
First we show that if σj+2 ∈ RΓ(θ)j+2,2j, then σj+1j+2 (∅) = θj+1. If σj+2 ∈ RΓ(θ)j+2,2j,
by the induction hypothesis, µj+2
(
σii+1 (∅) = σii (∅) = θi, ·|Σ−(j+2)
)
= 1 for all
i ≤ j.
Consider the following two case:
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Case 2.3 (σj+1j+1 (∅) = θj+1). If σj+1j+2 (∅) 6= θj+1, then the game proceeds to the
second stage and player j+1 is the player i∗. Since σj+1j+2 (∅) 6= σj+1 (m [j + 1]) ,
player j + 2 gets punished by (I − j)D and the outcome is xj+1 (θj+1) . If
σj+1j+2 (∅) = θj+1, the game will proceed in the following possible ways: (1)
Player j + 2 is the player i∗. Player j + 2 gets punished by (I − j − 1)D and
the outcome is xj+2 (θj+2) . (2) Player j + 2 is not the player i
∗ and player
j + 2 gets neither reward nor penalty and the outcome is in A. In either case,
player j + 2 gets strictly better.
Case 2.4 (σj+1j+1 (∅) 6= θj+1). If σ1j+2 (∅) = θj+1, the game proceeds to the
second stage and from Claim 2.1 player j + 2 gets rewarded by (j + 1)D and
the outcome is xj+1 (θj+1) . This is the best player j+2 can expect in this game
by the construction of D.
Second we show if σj+1 ∈ RΓ(θ)j,2j+1, then σj+1j+1 (∅) = θj+1.
If σj+1 ∈ RΓ(θ)j,2j+1, then µj+1
(
σii+1 (∅) = σii (∅) = θi, σj+1j+2 (∅) = θj+1, ·|Σ−(j+1)
)
=
1. If σj+1j+1 (∅) 6= θj+1, then the game proceeds to the second stage and player
j+ 1 is the player i∗. Player j+ 1 gets punished by (I − j)D and the outcome
is xj+1 (θj+1) . If σ
j+1
j+1 (∅) = θj+1, the game will proceed in a ways such that
player j + 1 will be neither i∗ nor i∗ + 1. In any possible outcome of A, play-
er j + 1 will get neither reward nor penalty. Therefore, player 1 gets strictly
better.
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This completes the proof of Claim 4.
Claim 2.5. If σ ∈ RΓ(θ), then σii (∅) = σii+1 (∅) = θi.
Proof. This follows directly from Claim 2.4.
As discussed in Section 2.2, one general criticism about subgame perfect
implementation is that many results rely on the heavy use of the power of
backwards inductions. Indeed, the mechanism employed here is immune to
this criticism. Although at this point, the size of transfers needed can be
large, we will show the transfers can be made arbitrarily small.
2.5 Almost complete information
2.5.1 Solution and implementation
Now we consider a situation where the designer (1) is willing to fully implement
in initial rationalizable strategies, and (2) wants to implement in a continuous
manner. More specifically, we require that, in any model that embeds the
initial model, initial rationalizable strategy exists and any initial rationalizable
strategy profile yields the desired outcome, not only at all types of the initial
model but also at all types “close” to initial types. We follow Oury and
Tercieux (2012) to define the notion of closeness in types, which formally
described by the product topology in the universal type space, captures the
restrictions on the modeler’s ability to observe the players’ (high order) beliefs.
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A model T is a pair (T, κ) , where T = T1 × T2 × · · · × TI is a countable
type space, and κ (ti) ∈ ∆ (Θ× T−i) denotes the associated belief for each
ti ∈ Ti. Let κ (ti) [E] denote the probability of any measurable set E ⊂ Θ ×
T−i given by κ (ti) . Let κΘ (ti) =margΘκ (ti) , κTj (ti) =margTj κ (ti) , and
κT−i (ti) =margT−iκ (ti) .
For two models T = (T, κ) and T ′ = (T ′, κ′), we will write T ⊃ T ′ if
T ⊃ T ′ and for every ti ∈ T ′i , we have κ (ti) [E] = κ′i (ti)
[
T ′−i ∩ E
]
for any
measurable E ⊂ T−i.
A planner aims to implement a social choice function that is a mapping
f : T → ∆ (A), where T = T1 × T2 × · · · × TI .
Given a model (T, κ) and any type ti in type space Ti, the first-order belief
of ti on Θ is computed as
h1i (ti) = margΘκ (ti) .
Second-order belief of ti is his belief about (θ, h
1
1 (t1) , ..., h
1
I (tI)) , set as




θ, h11 (t1) , ..., h
1
I (tI)
) ∈ F}] ,
where F ⊂ Θ×∆ (Θ)I is a measurable set. An entire hierarchy of beliefs can
be computed similarly. A type of a player i induces an infinite hierarchy of
beliefs
(
h1i (ti) , h
2
i (ti) , ..., h
l
i (ti) , ...
)
. We denote by T ∗i the set of player i’s






i is endowed with
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the product topology so that we say a sequence of types {ti [k]}∞k=0 converges
to a type ti, if, for every ` ∈ N, h`i(ti)[k] → h`i(ti) as k → ∞. We write
ti [k]→p ti for this class of convergent sequences.
A model T = (T, κ) is finite if each Ti is a finite set and suppκ (ti) is finite
for each ti ∈ Ti. In Section 2.4, we focused on the complete information
environment. In this situation, given a finite set of states of nature Θ, whenever
the true state is θ, it is assumed to be common belief among agents. To
incorporate this in our setting, we define the complete information finite model
T¯ = (T¯θ, κ¯) such that for each player i, for any t¯θ ∈ T¯θ, κ¯ (t¯i,θ) [(θ, t¯−i,θ)] = 1.
Now we are ready to define almost complete information formally. As play-
ers’ values are private, when we consider incomplete information, we sometimes
model the uncertainty from other players’ values while each player still knows
his own value. In the following lines, we consider a slightly more general in-
complete information environments around complete information. Specifically,
each player holds a small uncertainty about his own payoff types, that is, each
player almost knows his own payoff type. In addition, whether or not some
player knows other players’ type will not change his conjecture over his own
payoff type. We write κ (ti) [θi] =margΘiκ (ti) [θi] for the belief on his own





for the belief conditional on some t−i. Formally, it is captured by the following
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definition.
Definition 2.5 (convergence in private values). Fix a model T . We say a
sequence of types {ti [k]}∞k=0 converges to a type ti in private values where
ti [k] ∈ Ti and ti ∈ Ti if, for any t−i ∈ T−i, such that κ (ti [k]) [t−i] > 0,
κ (ti [k]) [θi|t−i]→ κ (ti) [θi] as k →∞
We write ti [k]→pp ti for the class of convergent sequences which converge both
in product topology and in private values.
Now let us take a close look at the comparison between the perturbed
informations structure we defined and the one used in Theorems 1 and 2 from
AFHKT (2012). They define a small perturbation of the information structure
of the following form: each player i = 1, 2 receives a signal sk,li where k and
l are both integers in {1, ..., n} ; the set of signals of player i is denoted by
Si. We assume the prior joint probability distribution ν
ε over the product of



















































n4 − n2 for k1 6= k or l2 6= l,
where µ is a complete information prior over states of nature and signal pairs






2) = 0 whenever (ki, li) 6= (k, l) for
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. This corresponds to an information perturbation with
the property that each player i’s signal is much more informative about his
own preferences than about the preferences of other player.
Let P denote the set of priors over Θ × S with the following metric d :
P × P → R+ :for any µ, µ′ ∈ P ,
d (µ, µ′) = max
(θ,s)∈Θ×S
|µ (θ, s)− µ′ (θ, s)| .
Obviously the perturbation νε → µ, as d (νε, µ)→ 0 as ε→ 0.
Aghion et al. (2012) model the incomplete information using a standard
type space. That is, there is an ex ante stage during which each player ob-
serves a private signal about the payoffs, and the joint distribution of signals
and payoffs is commonly known. Instead, we focus on the alternative class of
situations, genuine situations of incomplete information. There is no ex ante
stage; each player begins with some first order beliefs, some second-order be-
liefs and so on. This method is introduced by Harsanyi (1967) and developed
in Mertens and Zamir (1985). We follow the interim approach due to Wein-
stein and Yildiz (2007) and define the “nearby” types. This notion formally
described by the product topology in the universal type space.
The relation between our model and the structure in AFHKT (2012) is
summarized as follows. First, instead of assuming the joint distribution of
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signals and payoffs are common knowledge, we start with interim beliefs of
each player and also capture the restrictions on the modeler’s ability to observe
the players’ beliefs. Second, AFHKT (2012) fix a finite type space, where
the signal is a one-to-one mapping into the payoff types; while we model
the nearby types with belief hierarchy which allows for infinite types close
to the benchmark types. Third, both AFHKT (2012) and our model explore
the private values environment and naturally assume that players’ signals are
much more informative over their own payoff types than others’ payoff types.
We define initial rationalizability in a general model as follows. We model
player i’s uncertain over the states (payoff type profiles), other players’ types
and other players’ strategies, denoted by Ω = Θ×T−i×Σ−i. Let B−i a collection
of subsets of Σ−i conditional on which player i forms a belief over Ω. We say
that µ is consistent if
∑
σ−i µ (ti) [θ, t−i, σ−i|Σ−i] = κ (ti) [θ, t−i] for any θ and t.
Note that throughout this paper, players’ values are private, that is Θ = ×iΘi
and each player i’s utility function is given as ui : ∆(A)×Θi → R. We write
µ [θi] =margΘiµ [θi] and in case player i knows other players types t−i, we write
µ [θi|t−i] for the conditional belief. The following definition is specifically given
under the game U (Γ, T ) .
When a strategy σi is used, player i’s type is ti, player i’s payoff type is θi,
player i holds CPS µ, and history h is realized, the expected payoff of player
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i is given as follows:





{ui(g((σi(ti), σ−i(t−i));h), θi)+τi(σ(t))}µ [(θ, t−i, σ−i)|Σ−i(h)] .
Definition 2.6 (Sequential Rationality). Fix a player i ∈ I, ti ∈ Ti, a CPS
µ ∈ ∆B−i (Ω) and a strategy σi ∈ Σi. Say that σi is a sequential best response
to µ iff, for all σ′i ∈ Σi, for all h ∈ H,
Vi(σi, ti, µ|h) ≥ Vi(σ′i, ti, µ|h).
We know that for any active player in the second stage, his payoff is only
based on his own strategy and his own payoff type. Therefore, the requirement
is regardless of other players’ payoff types, types or strategies when player i
knows his payoff type. We can decompose the definition of sequential ratio-







′| m[i]), for any m [i] , for any µ′ ∈ ∆B−i (Ω)
}
.
Fix a player i ∈ I, ti ∈ Ti, a CPS µ ∈ ∆
(
Θ× T−i × Σ∗−i (T−i)
)
and a
strategy σi ∈ Σ∗i (ti) . Say that σi is a sequential best response to µ iff, for
all σ′i ∈ Σi
Vi(σi, ti, µ|∅) ≥ Vi(σ′i, ti, µ|∅).
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Therefore, the sequential best reply property coincides with the best reply
property in static games. The initial rationalizability collapses to interim
correlated rationalizability after we refine the strategy profiles according to
the sequential rationality in the second stage.
Definition 2.8 (Initial Rationalizability). Fix a multistage game form Γ. For
every player i ∈ I, let R0i (ti|Γ, T ) = Σ∗i (ti) . Inductively, for every integer
k > 0, let
Rki (ti|Γ, T ) =
σi ∈ Σi :
there exists µ ∈ ∆ (Θ× T−i × Σ∗−i (T−i)) such that
(1) µ [(θ, t−i, σ−i)] > 0⇒ σ−i ∈ Rk−1−i (t−i|Γ, T )
(2) σi ∈ arg maxVi (σ′i, ti, µ|∅)
(3)
∑
σ−i µ (ti) [θ, t−i, σ−i|Σ−i] = κ (ti) [θ, t−i]





i (ti|Γ, T ) .
Definition 2.9. A social choice function f is implementable in initial
rationalizable strategies if there exists a mechanism Γ such that, for all
t ∈ T and m ∈M , R (t|Γ, T ) 6= ∅ and m ∈ R (t|Γ, T )⇒ g (m) = f (t) .
Note that in complete information, the conjecture µ of player i of type ti,θ
is degenerate with respect to (θ, t−i) . The definitions above are the same as
defined in Section 2.4. Now we give the formal definition of robust implemen-
tation.
Definition 2.10. A social choice function f is robustly implementable if
there exists a finite mechanism Γ = (M, g) such that (i) for all t, R (t|Γ, T ) 6=
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∅; (ii) for any t¯ ∈ T¯ and any sequence t[k]→pp t¯, whenever t[k] ∈ T for each
k, we have g
(
mk
)→ f(t¯), for any mk ∈ R (t [k] |Γ, T ) .
As discussed above, the perturbation in AFHKT (2012) is a special case
of nearby environment defined by the universal type space. In contrast to the
negative result AFHKT (2012) got using the MR mechanism, our mechanism
achieves robust implementation under the same perturbation. This is because
we take advantage of the simultaneous move in the two-stage game and make
full use of stochastic mechanisms.
2.5.2 Main result
Theorem 2.2. Suppose I ≥ 2, then any social choice function is robustly
implementable.
We use the following claim to prove Theorem 2.2.
Claim 2.6. For any t¯ ∈ T¯ and any sequence t[k]→pp t¯, whenever t[k] ∈ T for
k large enough, we have Σ∗i (ti (k)) = Σ
∗
i (t¯i) .
Proof. By convergence in private values, we know that, for any t¯i,θ ∈ T¯θ and
any sequence t[k]→pp t¯θ,
κ (ti [k]) [θi|t−i]→ κ (t¯i,θ) [θi] as k →∞ for any t−i.
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σi ∈ argmaxVi(σ′i, ti, µ|m[i]) for any m [i]
}





{ui(g((σi(ti), σ−i(t−i));m[i]), θi) + τi(m[i])}µ [(θ, t−i, σ−i)|Σ−i(m[i])]
Σ∗i (ti) is the best response set of player i of type ti, which only depends up-
on what player i believes as his own payoff type. Hence, for each σi ∈ Σ∗i ,
Vi(σi, ti, µ|m[i]) can be rearranged as follows:














µ [t−i|σ−i]µ [σ−i|Σ−i (m [i])]+τi(m[i])
for any m [i] .
Note that no matter what other players’ types t−i are, we obtain
κ (ti [k]) [θi|t−i]→ κ (ti,θ) [θi] = 1 as k →∞.
This implies that for any t−i,
µ (ti [k]) [θi|t−i]→ 1 as k →∞.
From Lemma 2.1, we have that for all θi, θ
′
i ∈ Θi with θi 6= θ′i,
ui (xi (θi) , θi) > ui (xi (θ
′
i) , θi) .
Fix any such θi, θ
′












i) , θi)µ (ti [k]) [θi|t−i]µ[t−i|σ−i]µ[σ−i|Σ−i(m[i])].
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That is, Σ∗i (ti (k)) = Σ
∗
i (t¯i) .
We then recall the following well known lemma.
Lemma 2.2. (Dekel, Fudenberg, and Morris (2006)) Fix any model T =
(T, θ, pi) such that T¯ ⊂ T , and any finite mechanism Γ. (i) For any t¯ ∈ T¯ and
any sequence {t [k]}∞k=0 in T, if t [n] →p t¯, then, for k large enough, we have
R (t [k] |Γ, T ) ⊂ R (t¯ [k] |Γ, T ) . (ii) For any type t ∈ T, R (t|Γ, T ) is nonempty.
This lemma completes the proof with Claim 2.6.
2.6 Application
There are two players. We follow Maskin and Tirole (1999) to assume players
are risk averse, and follow their assumptions:
(a) for all θ ∈ Θ functions take the form
uθi (a, ti) = Ui (ui (a, θ) + ti) for i = 1, 2,
where Ui : R→ R is increasing and strictly concave;
(b) individual players’ transfers are denoted by
T = {(t1, t2) |t1 + t2 = 0} .
Contrast to Maskin and Tirole (1999), we drop the assumption that there is no
bound on the magnitude of the transfers. Instead, we will show that our result
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extends to the environment with restricted transfers T = {(t1, t2) |t1 + t2 = 0, and |ti| < τ¯}
for any τ¯ > 0. We use (Γ, τ¯) to denote a mechanism with transfers bounded
by τ¯ .
The renegotiation process can be expressed as a function: h : A×Θ→ A˜,
where A˜ = A × R2 is the set of outcomes (alternatives A and transfers R2).
We write h (a, θ) for the equilibrium renegotiated outcome, starting from the
mechanism-prescribed outcome (a, t1, t2) in state θ. That is, we adopt the
assumption in Maskin and Tirole (1999) that renegotiation is independent of
(t1, t2) for expositional convenience. Given any (a, t1, t2) , any θ,
h (a, θ) =
(
aθ, t1 + ∆t
θ





where ∆tθi (a) is the renegotiation-transfer and ∆t
θ
1 (a) + ∆t
θ
2 (a) = 0. Let











Remark 2.1. Note that when we say the transfer is arbitrarily small in our
mechanism, the transfer is specified by the mechanism. It is natural that the
renegotiation-transfer can be arbitrary subject to players’ wealth constraint. In
addition, if Γ implements f subject to renegotiation, the renegotiation-transfer
can be large. For example, if f (θ) is inefficient in φ and h (f (θ) , φ) =(




, then it is possible that the maginitude of
∆tφi (f (θ)) is large for some player i.
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We follow Maskin and Moore (1999) to restate the assumptions about
h (·, ·) as follows.
Assumption A1 (Renegotiation is predictable). h (·, ·) is a function that is
common knowledge to the individuals.
Assumption A2 (Renegotiation is efficient). h (a, θ) is Pareto optimal for
all (a, t1, t2) ∈ A˜ and θ ∈ Θ (that is, there does not exist (a′, t′) ∈ A˜ such
that uθi (a
′, t′i) ≥ uθi (h (a, θ)) for all i, with strict preference for some i).
Assumption A3 (Renegotiation is individually rational). For all (a, t1, t2) ∈
A˜ and θ ∈ Θ, and all i, uθi (h (a, θ)) ≥ uθi (a, ti) .
Given a social choice function f and a renegotiation function h, we say
that f is implementable in SPE with renegotiation function h if there exists
a mechanism Γ such that f (θ) = h ◦ g (mθ) , where mθ is a subgame perfect
equilibrium in Γθ subject to renegotiation function h for any θ ∈ Θ.
For simplicity, we assume states are describle and show how our mechanism
works subject to renegotiation. By Maskin and Tirole (1999), indescribility
does not constrains the set of implementable social choice rules. It follows
immediately that if f is implementable subject to renegotiation, f (θ) must be
Pareto efficient in state θ for any θ.
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We adopt a modified version of individual players’ preference assumption
in the renegotiation environment.
For any state θ, player 1 has a preference ordering over the set of outcomes
{h (a˜, θ)}a˜∈A˜. We assume that under any two distinct state θ and θ′, player i
has two different preference orderings over the outcome set after renegotiation
and there is no total indifference over the outcomes under any θ. Formally, we
have the following assumption.
Assumption
(i) For any θ, θ′ ∈ Θ, uθi (h (·, θ)) is not a positive affine transformation of
uθ
′
i (h (·, θ′)) ;
(ii) For any θ, uθi (h (·, θ)) is not a constant function on A.
We abuse notation to use h (x, θ) to denote the lottery after renegotiation,
that is, with probability x [a] the outcome h (a, θ) is the one after renegotiation.
Thus, uθi (h (x, θ)) denotes player i’s expected utility from x subject to rene-
gotiation function h. Now we obtain an important lemma in the environment
allowing renegotiation. We consider Lemma 2.3 in renegotiation environment
as a counter part of Lemma 2.1.

















for any θ′ 6= θ.
Remark 2.2. Maskin and Tirole (1999) assume that the efficient outcome in
any state is unique and adopt an implicit assumption that for any distinct pair
{θ, θ′} there exist a pair of outcomes {a, a′} ⊂ A such that ∆tθ1 (a) > ∆tθ1 (a′)
and ∆tθ
′




Theorem 2.3. Assume that utility functions take the form u˜θi (a, ti) = Ui
(
uθi (a) + ti
)
for i = 1, 2 with Ui increasing and strictly concave, and that f is Pareto-
optimal. Then for any τ¯ > 0, f is implementable in subgame perfect equilibri-
um by a mechanism (Γ, τ¯) subject to renegotiation.
2.6.1 Mechanism
The allocation


















(before renegotiation) is implemented. Otherwise, we proceed to the Sec-
ond Stage.


















(before renegotiation) is implemented.
2.6.2 The transfer
Let γ, ξ and η be positive numbers.
Second Stage
(i) Player 1 pays γ to player 2;
(ii) If mK+11 = m
0
2, then there is no extra transfer;
If mK+11 6= m02 (let θˆ ≡ m01 for simplicity of notation), then Q > 0 > L
















































































max {Q, |L|} < τ.





can choose Q and L to get the second inequality.
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First Stage
Player i is to pay player j 6= i:
1. • ξ if he is the first player whose kth announcement (k ≥ 1) differs













j for all k
′ ∈ {1, ..., k − 1} for all j;
0 otherwise.
(2.2)
















|Ui (h (a˜, θ))− Ui (h (a˜′, θ))| ,
where A˜Γ is the set of outcomes specified by the mechanism. For
any τ > 0, we can choose γ, ξ, and η such that
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γ − ξ −Kη > 0 (2.4)
(1− ε) {Ui (h (a˜, θ) + γ − ξ −Kη)− Ui (h (a˜, θ))} > εB. (2.5)
Suppose the true state is θ.
Claim 2.7. At second stage, it is sequential rational for player 1 to choose
mK+11 = θ.
Proof. SupposemK+11 = θ
′ 6= θ. Let m¯1 be such that m¯q1 = mq1 for all q 6= K+1,
and m¯K+11 = θ. For any h 6= ∅,






















Since m¯1 and m1 differs only at the second stage, the utility difference is
from the “ε′′ lottery and whether player 1 gets paid by the (Q,L) lottery.






)− γ) − δ
2









is maximum payoff from playing m1; the last inequality
follows from Lemma 2.3. Therefore, it is sequential rational for player 1 to
choose mK+11 = θ.
Claim 2.8. If m is a SPE of Γθ, then m02 = θ.
Proof. We prove Claim 2.8 in the following two cases: (i) m01 = θ; (ii) m
0
1 6= θ.
In case (i), suppose m02 6= θ, then the game proceeds to the second stage.
From Claim 2.7, player 1 will announce θ in the second stage. Since m02 6= θ,
player 2 will pay the lottery (Q,L) to player 1. In terms of the transfers in the
first stage, the possible gain from choosing m02 rather than θ is bounded above
by ξ+Kη. In total, the possible payoff for player 2 from m02 is bounded above
by
U2 (h (l, θ)− γ + ξ +Kη)












q 6= 0, and m¯02 = θ. The payoff from choosing m¯2 is
U2 (h (l, θ)) .
By (2.4), player 2 is worse off from choosing m02 6= θ rather than m¯2.
In case (ii), if m02 = θ, then the game proceeds to the second stage. From
Claim 2.7, player 1 will announce θ in the second stage. From the transfer
rule, player 2 gets paid γ. The possible loss is from “ε′′ lottery by triggering
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the second stage. The possible loss from choosing m02 = θ is bounded above




2 for all q 6= 0, and m¯02 = m01. In total,
the least possible payoff difference for player 2 from m02 rather than choosing
m¯02 is bounded below by
U2 (h (l (ε, θ) , θ) + γ − ξ −Kη)− U2 (h (l, θ))









+ γ − ξ −Kη)− U2 (h (l, θ) , θ)}
> (1− ε) {U2 (h (l, θ)) + γ − ξ −Kη)− U2 (h (l, θ))}
> 0
Therefore, player 2 is better off from choosing m02 = θ rather than telling a
lie. It is easy to check player 2 will get worse off if he chooses m02 6= m01, where
m02 6= θ.
Claim 2.9. If m is a SPE of Γθ, then m01 = θ.
Proof. From Claim 2.7 and Claim 2.8, if m01 6= θ, then the second stage is
triggered and player 1 pays γ to player 2. The minimum loss is γ, while the
possible gain is from “ε′′ lottery and the transfers in the first stage. Let m¯1
be such that m¯q1 = m
q
1 for all q 6= 0, and m¯01 = θ. In total, the least possible
payoff difference for player 1 from m01 6= θ rather than choosing θ is bounded
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above by
U1 (h (l (ε, θ) , θ)− γ + ξ +Kη)− U1 (h (l, θ))








)− γ + ξ +Kη)− U1 (h (l, θ))}
< 0
Therefore, player 1 is worse off from choosing m02 6= θ rather than telling the
truth.
Claim 2.10. If m is a SPE of Γθ, then mki = θ, for any i, any k ≥ 0.
Proof. We prove Claim 2.10 inductively. We have established that if m is a
SPE of Γθ, then m0i = θ. Suppose m
0
i = ... = m
k−1
i = θ for all i. We show that





all q 6= k, and m¯ki = θ. Suppose mkj 6= θ for j 6= i. Then minimum loss from
playing mi is ξ+η by the transfer rule. In terms of allocation, the possible gain
from playing mi is
1
K
B. By (2.4), player i is worse off from playing mi rather
than m¯i. Suppose m
k
j = θ for j 6= i. Then the minimum loss from playing
mi is η. In terms of allocation, player i cannot get better by the truthful
implementability of f. Therefore, player i is worse off from playing mi rather
than m¯i. This completes the proof.
76
The existing literature is concerned about the renegotiation problem. Maskin
and Tirole (1999) introduce a stochastic transfer from the seller to the buyer.
If the buyer is risk-averse, then this fine can be designed so that it hurts both
the seller and the buyer. However, if parties are close to risk-neutral, the s-
tochastic fine that is required needs to have a very large variance, which is not
very credible as it will violate the wealth constraints. Thus the applicability
of the irrelevance theorem is doubtful in this case. Our mechanism adopts the
idea of Abreu and Matsushima (1992) to break up the large payments into
arbitrarily small scale. Therefore, this permissive mechanism is immune to
renegotiation with arbitrarily small cost.
2.7 Discussion
We first provide a way to achieve budget balance when there are at least three
players. We conclude with a comparison between dynamic mechanisms and
static ones.
2.7.1 Budget balance
When there are at least three players, the transfers specified at the last stage
can be made between the pair of players (i∗, i∗+1) and the other players. This
mild modification does not change the incentive of any players. Moreover, all
the arguments above still hold. Therefore we can achieve budget balance
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everywhere (both on and off the solution outcome).
2.7.2 Dynamic vs static mechanisms
Robustness of the implementation problem is studied by researchers recently.
The pioneering work of Chung and Ely (2003) shows that when players’ values
are interdependent if we adopt undominated Nash equilibrium as the solution
concept, then Maskin monontonicity is a necessary condition for robust im-
plementation. When players’ values are private, Chen et al. (2014) show that
any incentive compatible social choice function is robustly implementable if
we use the solution S∞W, which is obtained by deletion of weakly dominated
strategies followed by iterative deletion of strictly dominated strategies. Con-
sider dynamic mechanisms. Aghion et al. (2012) show that when players’
values are interdependent if we adopt subgame-perfect equilibrium as the so-
lution concept, then Maskin monontonicity is also a necessary condition for
robust implementation. This paper shows that if players’ values are private,





The theory of implementation and mechanism design is mainly concerned with
the following question: what is the set of outcomes that can be achieved by
institutions (or mechanisms)? This institutional design problem is particular-
ly relevant when a group of individuals with conflicting interests has to make
a collective decision. The key question then becomes: when can individual-
s, acting in their own self-interest, arrive at the outcomes consistent with a
given welfare criterion (or social choice rule)? To characterize the set of Pare-
to efficient allocations, for instance, we must know the preferences of those
individuals, which is dispersed among the individuals involved. If Pareto ef-
ficiency is guaranteed, we must elicit this information from the individuals.
In what follows, an individual’s private information relevant to implementing
some welfare criterion is referred to as the individual’s type. Obviously, the
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difficulty of eliciting types lies in the fact that individuals need not tell the
truth.
For this elicitation, we start our discussion from the notion of partial im-
plementation. We say that a social choice rule is partially implementable if
there exists (i) a mechanism, and (ii) an equilibrium whose outcome coin-
cides with that specified by the rule. To understand the class of partially
implementable rules, we often appeal to the revelation principle, which says
that whenever partial implementation is possible, one can always duplicate
the same equilibrium outcome by using the truthful equilibrium in the direct
revelation mechanism. Thus, a necessary condition for the implementation of
any welfare criterion is its incentive compatibility, which is simply the proper-
ty such that the best thing for each individual to do in the direct revelation
mechanism is to report his true type as long as all other individuals truth-
fully announce their types. This fundamental insight allows us to transform
any implementation problem into the planner’s problem of maximizing a given
social welfare, subject to incentive compatibility-constraints. This is the stan-
dard constrained-optimization problem. Due to its tractability, this approach
turns out to be powerful enough to produce many applications–in auctions,
bargaining, organizational economics, monetary economics, and many others
domains.
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Although the revelation principle can be adopted in many applications,
it is important to realize that the direct revelation mechanism may possess
other untruthful equilibria whose outcomes are not consistent with the wel-
fare criterion. This problem of multiple equilibria is not merely hypothetical;
rather, it has been found by researchers in numerous contexts to be a severe
problem, as demonstrated by Bassetto and Phelan (2008) in optimal income
taxation, Demski and Sappington (1984) in incentive contracts, Postlewaite
and Schmeidler (1986) and Palfrey and Srivastava (1987) in Bayesian imple-
mentation in exchange economies, and Repullo (1985) in dominant-strategy
equilibrium implementation in social choice environments. In order to take
seriously the problems resulting from the multiplicity of equilibria, some re-
searchers have turned to the question of full implementation, and explored the
conditions under which the set of equilibrium outcomes coincides with a given
welfare criterion. The literature of full implementation proposes a variety of
mechanisms with the additional property that undesirable outcomes do not
arise as equilibria. These proposed mechanisms originally looked promising as
a way to fix the direct revelation mechanism. However, many of these mech-
anisms share one serious drawback: undesirable equilibria are eliminated by
triggering the “integer games” in which each player announces an integer and
the player who announces the highest integer gets to be a dictator. For exam-
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ple, Palfrey and Srivastava (1989) establish a very permissive implementation
result in private-value environments: any incentive compatible social rule can
be fully implementable in undominated Bayes Nash equilibrium. However,
their mechanism also employ the integer games. Many researchers consider
the integer game or any variant of it as an unrealistic device, presumably re-
lying on the argument that the truthful equilibrium is cognitively simple and
can be a strong focal point among the individuals involved; those researchers
confine themselves to characterizing incentive-compatible rules. Thus, there
is a clear divide between those who are content with partial implementation
and those who work on full implementation; moreover, there is unfortunately
little interaction between them.
The main objective of this paper is to build a bridge between partial and
full implementation. Before going into the detail of our results, we shall s-
tart by articulating the domain of problems to which our results apply. First,
we consider environments in which monetary transfers among the players are
available and all players have quasilinear utilities. We focus on this class of
environments because most of the settings in the applications of mechanism
design are in economies with money. Second, we employ the stochastic mech-
anisms in which lotteries are explicitly used. Therefore, we assume that each
player has von Neumann-Morgenstern expected utility. Third, we focus on
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private-value environments. That is, each player’s utility depends only upon
his own payoff type (but not the other players’ payoff types) as well as upon
the lottery chosen and his monetary payment (or subsidy). Fourth, we assume
that no players use weakly dominated actions in the game. An action ai is
weakly dominated by another action a′i if, no matter how other players play
the game, a′i cannot be worse than ai and sometimes it can be strictly better.
We consider eliminating weakly dominated actions as a minor qualification on
the players’ strategic behavior because most refinements of Nash equilibrium
do not involve weakly dominated actions. Finally, we adopt an approximate
version of full implementation, which aims at achieving the socially optimal
outcome together with some small ex post transfers. We say that a social
choice rule is implementable with arbitrarily small transfers if one can design a
mechanism whose set of equilibrium outcomes coincides with that specified by
the rule, which allows for arbitrarily small ex post transfers among the players.
Given the preparation we have made thus far, we are ready to state our
main result: a social choice rule is implementable with arbitrarily small trans-
fers if and only if it is incentive compatible (Theorem 2). This is quite consis-
tent with the idea of partial implementation because if the planner is content
with small ex post transfers, the only constraint for full implementation is
incentive compatibility. However, the mechanism we employ here is not the
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direct revelation mechanism. Rather, our mechanism is based on the mech-
anism in Abreu and Matsushima (1994), but we extend it to an incomplete-
information environment. We must also stress that our mechanism is finite
and uses no devices like integer games. Recall that Palfrey and Srivastava
(1989) use the integer games to show a similar permissive result. Although
our mechanism, unlike Palfrey and Srivastava (1989), exploits the power of ex
post transfers, we can make these transfers arbitrarily small. Since small ex
post transfers result in only an arbitrarily small cost for full implementation,
we believe that all individuals would be willing to accept this small cost as
a negligible entry fee to participate in the mechanism. We will show that all
these features of our mechanism are valuable ones, which remove it from the
scope of the criticisms usually made of full implementation.
Oury and Tercieux (2012) recently shed light on the connection between
partial and full implementation. They consider the following situation: The
planner wants not only one equilibrium of his mechanism to yield a desired
outcome in his initial model (i.e., partial implementation) but it to continue
to do so in all models “close” to his initial model. This is what they call con-
tinuous (partial) implementation. Oury and Tercieux show that when sending
messages in the mechanism is slightly costly, Bayesian monotonicity, which
is a necessary condition for full implementation, becomes necessary for con-
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tinuous implementation. Hence, continuous implementation can be a strong
argument for full implementation.
Like Oury and Tercieux (2012), we also show that our mechanism achieves
continuous implementation as long as the planner can allow for small ex post
transfers (Theorems 5 and 6). Recall that we assume that no players use
weakly dominated actions. In fact, this weak dominance will be highly sensitive
to payoff perturbations induced by the cost of sending messages. It is for this
reason that our continuous implementation result does not follow from Oury
and Tercieux (2012).
While the use of small ex post transfers strikes us as being innocuous, it
would still be interesting to know when we can avoid any ex post transfers “on
the equilibrium.” If there is no ex post transfers “on the equilibrium”, a social
choice rule is said to be implementable with no transfers. We propose two class-
es of environments in which we can achieve implementation with no transfers.
The first class of environments is the case of nonexclusive-information (NEI)
structures (Theorem 3). NEI captures the situation in which any unilateral
deception from the truth-telling in the direct revelation mechanism can be
detected. Furthermore, since complete-information environments can be con-
sidered a special case of NEI, our Theorem 3 can be considered an extension
of the result of Abreu and Matsushima (1994) to incomplete-information envi-
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ronments. The second class of environments is the case in which there are no
consumption externalities among the players and each player only cares about
his own consumption (Theorem 4). We can think of exchange economies as an
example of this situation. In this environment, however, we need to strengthen
incentive compatibility.
If the planner wants all equilibria of his mechanism yield a desired out-
come, and entertains the possibility that players may have even the slightest
uncertainty about payoffs, then the planner should insist on a solution concept
with a closed graph. Chung and Ely (2003) add this closed-graph property to
full implementation in undominated Nash equilibrium (i.e., Nash equilibrium
where no players use weakly dominated actions) and call the corresponding
concept “UNE-implementation”. They show that Maskin monotonicity, a
necessary condition for Nash implementation, becomes a necessary condition
for UNE-implementation. For their proof, Chung and Ely need to construct
a complete information environment nearby, in which some players have su-
perior information about the preferences of other players. Since we focus only
on private-value environments, their result does not apply to us. Instead, we
show that any incentive-compatible social choice rule is UNE-implementable
with no transfers (Corollary 2).
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: In Section 2, we introduce the
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preliminary notation and definitions as well as two assumptions (Assumptions
1 and 2) that we maintain throughout the paper. In Section 3, we construct
a mechanism and discuss some of its basic properties. Section 4 provides our
main results. More specifically, we establish Theorem 1 for implementation
with transfers (Section 4.1), Theorem 2 for implementation with arbitrarily
small transfers (Section 4.2), and Theorems 3 and 4 for implementation with
no transfers (Section 4.3). Section 5 discusses three applications of our re-
sults: we investigate the connection to continuous implementation (Section
5.1), to UNE-implementation (Section 5.2), and to the full surplus extraction
(Section 5.3). In Section 6, we provide some extensions of our results and
also discuss the limitations of our results. In particular, we discuss the role of
honesty and rationalizable implementation (Section 6.1); we identify a class
of interdependent-value environments to which our permissive results can be
extended (Section 6.2); we propose a way of achieving budget balance when
there are at least three individuals (Section 6.3); and finally, we compare our
results with those of virtual implementation, a process in which the planner





Let I denote a finite set of players and with abuse of notation, we also denote
by I the cardinality of I. The set of pure social alternatives is denoted by A,
and ∆ (A) denotes the set of all probability distributions over A with countable
supports. In this context, a ∈ A denotes a pure social alternative and x ∈ ∆(A)
denotes a lottery on A.
The utility index of player i over the set A is denoted by ui : A × Θi →
R, where Θi is the countable set of payoff types and ui(a, θi) specifies the
bounded utility of player i from the social alternative a under θi ∈ Θi. Denote
Θ = Θ1 × · · · ×ΘI and Θ−i = Θ1 × · · · ×Θi−1 ×Θi+1 × · · · ×ΘI .1 We abuse
notation to use ui(x, θi) as player i’s expected utility from a lottery x ∈ ∆ (A)
under θi. We also assume that player i’s utility is quasilinear in transfers,
denoted by ui(x, θi) + τi where τi ∈ R.
A model T is a triplet (Ti, θˆi, pii)i∈I , where T is a countable type space;
θˆi : Ti → Θi; and pii(ti) ∈ ∆(T−i) denotes the associated belief for each ti ∈ Ti.
We assume that each player of type ti always knows his own type ti. For
each type profile t = (ti)i∈I , let θˆ(t) denote the payoff type profile at t, i.e.,
θˆ(t) ≡ (θˆi(ti))i∈I . If Ti is a finite set, then we say (Ti, θˆi, pii)i∈I is a finite model.
1Similar notation will be used for other product sets.
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Let pii (ti) [E] denote the probability that pii (ti) assigns to any set E ⊂ T−i.
Given a model (Ti, θˆi, pii)i∈I and a type ti ∈ Ti, the first-order belief of ti
on Θ is computed as follows: for any θ ∈ Θ,
h1i (ti)[θ] = pii (ti) [{t−i ∈ T−i : θˆ(ti, t−i) = θ}].
The second-order belief of ti is his belief about t
1
−i, set as follows: for any
measurable set F ⊂ Θ×∆ (Θ)I−1,
h2i (ti)[F ] = pii(ti)
[
{t−i : (θˆ(ti, t−i), h1−i(t−i)) ∈ F}
]
.








is an infinite hierarchy of beliefs induced by type ti of player i. We assume the






i (ti) = margXh
l−1
i (ti) .
Therefore, we assume it is common knowledge that each player of type ti
always knows his own payoff type and holds coherent belief hierarchy. We







i is endowed with the product topology so that we say a
sequence of types {ti [n]}∞n=0 converges to a type ti (denoted as ti [n]→p ti), if
for every ` ∈ N, h`i(ti[n])→ h`i(ti) as n→∞. We write t[n]→p t if ti [n]→p ti
for all i.
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Throughout the paper, we consider a fixed environment E which is a triplet(
A, (ui)i∈I , T¯
)
with a finite model T¯ = (T¯i, θ¯i, p¯ii)i∈I and a planner who aims
to implement a social choice function (henceforth, SCF) f : T¯ → ∆ (A).2
3.2.2 Mechanisms, Solution Concepts, and Implemen-
tation
We assume that the planner can fine or reward a player i ∈ I by side pay-
ments. A mechanism M is a triplet ((Mi), g, (τi))i∈I where Mi is the nonempty
countable message space for player i; g : M → ∆ (A) is an outcome function;
and τi (m) : M → R is a transfer rule from player i ∈ I to the designer. A
mechanism M is finite if Mi is finite for every player i ∈ I. We say that a
mechanism M has fines and rewards bounded by τ¯ if |τi (m)| ≤ τ¯ for every
i ∈ I and every m ∈ M . Note that there is a class of such mechanisms given
τ¯ . We denote one of the mechanisms by (M, τ¯).
Given a mechanism M, let U(M, T ) denote an incomplete information
game associated with a model T . Fix a game U(M, T ), player i ∈ I and type
ti ∈ Ti. We say that mi ∈ Wi (ti|M, T ) if and only if there does not exist
2We will consider a countable model when we define and study continuous implementa-
tion in Section 5.1.
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ui(g(mi,m−i), θˆi(ti)) + τi (mi,m−i)
]
ν(m−i|t−i)pii(ti)[t−i]
for all ν : T−i → ∆ (M−i) and a strict inequality holds for some ν : T−i →
∆(M−i). We set S1i (ti|M, T ) = Wi (ti|M, T ). For any l ≥ 1, we say that















ui(g(mi,m−i), θˆi(ti)) + τi (mi,m−i)
]
ν(m−i|t−i)pii(ti)[t−i]
for all ν : T−i → ∆(M−i) and for all t−i and m−i, ν(m−i|t−i)pii(ti)[t−i] > 0




j (tj|M, T ). Let S∞W denote the
set of strategy profiles which survive one round of removal of weakly dominated
strategies followed by iterative removal of strictly dominated strategies, i.e.,
S∞i Wi (ti|M, T ) =
∞⋂
l=1
Sli (ti|M, T ) ,
S∞W (t|M, T ) =
∏
i∈I
S∞i Wi (ti|M, T ) .
Here we restrict attention to pure strategies, but without loss of generality.
In the mechanism we construct below, we have S∞W as a singleton; this con-
stitutes a unique, undominated Bayesian Nash equilibrium in pure strategies.
Moreover, this undominated Bayesian Nash equilibrium remains the unique
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equilibrium in the mechanism even when mixed strategies are allowed. Sev-
eral foundations for S∞W in normal-form games are known in the literature.
We refer the reader to Bo¨rgers (1994) and Dekel and Fudenberg (1990) for its
foundations in complete information games, and to Frick and Romm (2014)
for its foundation in incomplete information games. The order of elimination
of strategies in S∞W generally matters, as WS∞ (the set of strategy profiles
which survive iterative removal of strictly dominated strategies followed by
one round of removal of weakly dominated strategies) may well be different
from S∞W . In the appendix, we show that W∞ generates the same outcome
as S∞W in our mechanism, regardless of the order of removal of strategies,
where W∞ denotes the set of strategies that survive the iterative removal of
dominated strategy profiles. We can also define S∞ as the set of strategy
profiles that survive the iterative removal of strictly dominated strategies. It
is already well known that S∞ is order-independent and equivalent to the set
of all rationalizable strategies in finite mechanisms. In Section 6.1, we will
discuss the role of S∞ in our mechanism.
We introduce the following definition:
Definition 3.1. Fix a model T¯ . We say that a mechanism (M, τ¯) implements
an SCF f in S∞W with transfers if, for any t ∈ T¯ and m ∈ S∞W (t|M, T¯ ),
we have g(m) = f(t).
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We now formally state the definition of implementability in S∞W. First, we
impose no conditions on the magnitude of transfers and propose the concept
of implementation with transfers.
Definition 3.2 (Implementation with Transfers). An SCF f is implementable
in S∞W with transfers if there exists a mechanism (M, τ¯) which implements
f in S∞W with transfers.
It is often unrealistic to assume that the planner can impose large transfers
on the players. Hence, we only allow for arbitrarily small transfers and propose
the following concept.
Definition 3.3 (Implementation with Arbitrarily Small Transfers). An SCF
f is implementable in S∞W with arbitrarily small transfers if, for all τ¯ > 0,
there exists a mechanism (M, τ¯) which implements f in S∞W with transfers.
The concept of implementation with arbitrarily small transfers strikes us
being rather innocuous. Still, it is sometimes impossible to assume that the
planner can impose any transfers on the players in the equilibrium. Therefore,
we propose the concept of implementation with no transfers.
Definition 3.4 (Implementation with No Transfers). An SCF f is imple-
mentable in S∞W with no transfers if for all τ¯ > 0, it is implementable in
S∞W a mechanism (M, τ¯) and moreover, for any t ∈ T¯ , and m ∈ S∞W (t|M, T¯ ),
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we have τi(m) = 0 for each i ∈ I.
Remark 3.1. The concept of implementation with no transfers does not ex-
clude a possibility that arbitrarily small transfers are made ex post out of the
equilibrium. This concept of implementation is used by Abreu and Matsushima
(1994) under complete information. We extend this to incomplete-information
environments with private values.
3.2.3 Assumptions
Throughout the paper we make two assumptions on the environments. First,
we follow Abreu and Matsushima (1992a) and propose the following assump-
tion.
Assumption 3.1. An environment E = (A, (ui)i∈I , T¯ ) satisfies Assumption
3.1 if the following two conditions hold:
1. for each ti ∈ T¯i, ui(·, θˆi(ti)) is not a constant function on A;
2. for any ti, t
′
i ∈ T¯i with ti 6= t′i, ui(·, θˆi(ti)) is not a positive affine trans-
formation of ui(·, θˆi(t′i)).
Under Assumption 1, Abreu and Matsushima (1992a) show the following
important result. Lemma 3.1 guarantees the existence of a function that can
elicit each player’s type.
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Lemma 3.1. (Abreu and Matsushima (1992a)) Suppose that Assumption 1
holds. For each i ∈ I, there exists a function xi : T¯i → ∆(A) such that for any
ti, t
′
i ∈ T¯i with ti 6= t′i,
ui(xi(ti), θˆi(ti)) > ui(xi(t
′
i), θˆi(ti)) (3.1)
We next introduce the following assumption.
Assumption 3.2. An environment E satisfies Assumption 3.2 if, for all i ∈ I
and ti, t
′
i ∈ T¯i with ti 6= t′i, pii(ti) 6= pii(t′i).
Remark 3.2. Since T¯ is finite, if |Ti| = 1 or |T−i| ≥ 2, Assumption 3.2 gener-
ically holds in the space of the probability distributions over T¯ . Note, however,
that Assumption 3.2 fails to hold in the case of independent probability distri-
butions.
By Assumption 2, we can construct the following scoring rule d0i : T → R:
Lemma 3.2. Suppose that an environment E satisfies Assumption 3.2. For
all i ∈ I and (ti, t−i) ∈ T¯ , define
d0i (ti, t−i) = 2p¯ii (ti) [t−i]− p¯ii (ti) · p¯ii (ti) ,
where p¯ii (ti) · p¯ii (ti) denotes its inner (or dot) product. Then, for all i ∈ I and
ti, t
′
i ∈ T¯i with ti 6= t′i,∑
t−i∈T−i
[
d0i (ti, t−i)− d0i (t′i, t−i)
]
p¯ii (ti) [t−i] > 0. (3.2)
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Remark 3.3. Lemma 3.2 guarantees the existence of a proper scoring rule in
which each player will tell the truth whenever he believes that every other one
tells the truth. Such a constructed scoring rule is strictly Bayesian incentive
compatible. When there are more than two players, we can achieve budget
balance. (see the discussion in Section 3.6)
Proof. The construction of d0i (ti, t−i) makes itself a proper scoring rule. By
Assumption 3.2, the strict inequality of (3.2) always holds.
3.3 The Mechanism and its Basic Properties
3.3.1 The Mechanism
We define the mechanism as follows.
1. The message space:
Each player i makes (K + 3) simultaneous announcements of his own
type. We index each announcement by −2,−1, 0, 1, . . . , K. That is, play-
er i’s message space is
Mi = M
−2
i ×M−1i ×M0i × · · · ×MKi = T¯i × · · · × T¯i︸ ︷︷ ︸
K+3 times
,












) ∈M, mk = (mki )i∈I ∈Mk = ×i∈IMki .











2. The outcome function:
Let  ∈ (0, 1) be a small positive number.
Define e : M−1 ×M0 → R by
e(m−1,m0) =
{
 if m−1i 6= m0i for some i ∈ I,
0 otherwise.
The outcome function g : M → ∆ (A) is defined as follows: for each
m ∈M ,





















The outcome function contains a “random dictator” component (recall
the function xi defined in (3.1)) which is triggered in the event that
some player’s −1th announcement does not equal his 0th announcement.
When this event does not happen, only the nondictatorial component is
triggered, which consists of K equally weighted lotteries the kth of which
depends only on the I-tuple of kth announcements.
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3. The transfer rule:













is positive, it means player i is
paid);
• −λd0i (m−1−i ,m0i ) (if d0i (m−1−i ,m0i ) is positive, it means player i is
paid);3
• ξ if he is the first player whose kth announcement (k ≥ 1) differs













j for all k
′ ∈ {1, ..., k − 1} for all j;
0 otherwise.
(3.4)





























3The design of the two scoring rules is needed for establishing the order independence of
W∞ in the Appendix. The results in the main body of the paper still go through with one
scoring rule.
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4. Define Θ¯i = {θi ∈ Θi| θˆi(t¯i) = θi for some t¯i ∈ T¯i}. We provide the
























)− ui(f(mk−i, m¯ki ), θ¯i)} ,
(3.8)
where E multiplied by  is the upper bound of the gain for any player
i, of triggering or not triggering the random dictatorial component; D
is the maximum gain for player i from altering the kth announcement,
where k ≥ 1.
We choose positive numbers λ, γ, K, , η, and ξ such that for every i ∈ I
and every ti, t
′
i ∈ T¯i with ti 6= t′i,






i)− λd0i (t−i, ti)
]
p¯ii (ti) [t−i] > γ; (3.10)






γ > E + ξ +Kη, (3.13)
where d¯0i denotes an upper bound of d
0
i (t) over t ∈ T¯ .4
3.3.2 Basic Properties of the Mechanism
In this section, we exploit some basic properties of the mechanism constructed
in the previous section. These properties play an important role in the rest of
the paper.
Claim 3.1. In the game U





, then m−2i = t¯i.


















Fix any conjecture ν : T¯−i → ∆(M−i).
The difference of the expected values between m′i and mi for player i of
4Given any τ¯ > 0 exogenously, we first choose λ small enough so that λd¯0i <
1
4 τ¯ . Second,
by (3.2), we can choose γ small enough so that (3.10) holds. Third, we choose K large















. Therefore, we have τ¯ > 2λd¯0i +
1
KD+KE and γ > E +
1
KD+KE. From
these two inequalities, we can thus choose η and ξ such that (3.9), (3.11), (3.12) and (3.13)
hold.
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xi (t¯i) , θ¯i










xi (t¯i) , θ¯i
)− ui (xi (m−2i ) , θ¯i)}
≥ 0,
where the first equality follows because the only difference lies in function xi
when m′i differs from mi only in the first announcement, (see the definition
of g in (3.3) and the definition of τ in (3.6)); by (3.1) the last inequality is




The next claim says that telling a lie in round −1 is strictly dominated by
telling the truth, given the hypothesis that no players choose weakly dominated
messages.
Claim 3.2. In the game U
(M, T¯ ), for every i ∈ I, t¯i ∈ T¯i, if mi ∈ S2i (t¯i|M, T¯ ) ,
then m−1i = t¯i.
Proof. We show that for any i ∈ I, t¯i ∈ T¯i with θˆi(t¯i) = θ¯i, and mi ∈
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Then, for any conjecture ν : T¯−i → ∆(M−i), we have that, for each
(t−i,m−i),





The difference of the expected values under m¯i from mi for player i of type











































)− λd0i (m−2−i ,m−1i )} ν(m−i|t−i)pii(t¯i)[t−i]
Observe that when m¯i differs from mi only in the −1th announcement, the
difference in terms of g(·) (see the outcome function in (3.3)) lies in function
e(·) and the difference in terms of transfer is summarized in functions d0i (see
the transfer rule in (3.6)).
Note that
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(i) In terms of outcomes, the possible expected gain of player i of type t¯i by






















From (3.7), when playing mi rather than m¯i, this possible gain is bound-
ed above by E.








)− λd0i (m−2−i ,m−1i )] ν(m−i|t−i)pii(t¯i)[t−i].




implies m−2−i = t¯−i.


















where γ is chosen such that γ > E by (3.13).
Therefore, mi is strictly dominated by m¯i.
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Claim 3.3. In the game U
(M, T¯ ), for every i ∈ I, t¯i ∈ T¯i, if mi ∈ S3i (t¯i|M, T¯ ) ,
then m0i = t¯i.
Proof. We show that for any i ∈ I, t¯i ∈ T¯i with θˆi(t¯i) = θ¯i, if m0i 6= t¯i, then












Then, for any conjecture ν : T¯−i → ∆(M−i), we have that, for each
(t−i,m−i),











The difference of the expected values under m¯i from mi for player i of type
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1, . . . ,mK











)− dki (m0i ,mki )}ν(m−i|t−i)pii(t¯i)[t−i]
≥ −E + γ − ξ −Kη
> 0
Observe that when m¯i differs from mi only in the 0th announcement, the
difference in terms of g(·) (see the outcome function in (3.3)) lies in function
e(·) and the difference in terms of transfer is summarized in functions d0i , di,
and {dki }k=1,...,K (see the transfer rule in (3.6)).
Therefore, mi is strictly dominated by m¯i.
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3.4 Main Results
There are three subsections here. In Section 4.1, we provide a result of imple-
mentation with transfers where very large transfers are allowed. In Section 4.2,
we make the size of transfers arbitrarily small and establish a characterization
of implementation with arbitrarily small transfers. Here, incentive compatibil-
ity is an important condition. Finally, in Section 4.3, we propose two classes
of environments in each of which we need no transfers on the equilibrium in
the mechanism.
3.4.1 Implementation with Transfers
The following theorem shows that if we impose no conditions on the size of
transfers, any SCF is implementable with transfers. In this case, a very large
size of transfers might be needed even on the equilibrium.
Theorem 3.1. Suppose that the environment E satisfies Assumptions 3.1 and
3.2. Assume I ≥ 2. Any SCF is implementable in S∞W with transfers.
We use the following claim to prove Theorem 3.1.
Claim 3.4. Let K = 1. In the game U





, then m1i = t¯i.
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Proof. Fix i ∈ N , t¯i ∈ T¯i with θˆi(t¯i) = θ¯i. We shall show that





That is, we shall show that mi is strictly dominated. Let m˜i be the dominating










Then, for any conjecture ν : T¯−i → ∆(M−i), we have that, for each
(t−i,m−i),















{τi (m˜i,m−i)− τi (m)} ν(m−i|t−i)pii(t¯i)[t−i] = η + ξ, (3.15)
where player i of type t¯i will get punished by η according to rule d
1
i (by (3.5))
and ξ according to rule di (by (3.4)).
Note that e (m−1,m0) = 0. In terms of outcome function g(·) (defined in









From (3.8), we also have the following inequality on the expected gain of





1), θ¯i)− ui(f(t¯i,m1−i), θ¯i)
}
ν(m−i|t−i)pii(t¯i)[t−i] ≤ D. (3.16)
When K = 1, we know from Section 3.1 that ξ > D (see (3.12)).5 So, we
obtain
η + ξ > D. (3.17)


























{η + ξ −D} ν(m−i|t−i)pii(t¯i)[t−i]
> 0.
The first equality follows from the outcome function (3.3) and the transfer
rule (3.6); the second inequality follows from (3.16); the last inequality follows
from (3.17). Therefore, player i of type t¯i will report t¯i rather than m
1
i .
5When K = 1, we can appropriately choose λ, γ, , ξ, and η to satisfy those conditions
on transfers and utilities in Section 3.3.1. This means that ξ can be a very large number.
Since we now impose no restrictions on the size of transfers, by choosing λ > 0 large enough,
we can choose γ arbitrarily large to satisfy γ > E + ξ+ η (inequality (3.13)). Hence, ξ can
be chosen large enough to satisfy ξ > D (inequality (3.12)).
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3.4.2 Implementation with Arbitrarily Small Transfers
We shall show that if an SCF f is incentive compatible, our mechanism can
implement f in S∞W with arbitrarily small transfers. First, we introduce the




denote the expected utility generated by the direct revelation mechanism(
T¯ , f
)
for player i of type ti when he announces t
′
i and the other players
all make truthful announcements.
Definition 3.5. An SCF f : T¯ → ∆(A) is incentive compatible if, for all
i ∈ I and all ti, t′i ∈ T¯i,
∑
t−i∈T¯−i




We are now ready to state the main result of this section. The theorem
below shows that incentive compatibility is a necessary and sufficient condition
for implementation with arbitrarily small transfers.
Theorem 3.2. Suppose that the environment E satisfies Assumptions 3.1 and
3.2. Assume I ≥ 2. An SCF f is implementable in S∞W with arbitrarily
small transfers where S∞W
(
t|M, T¯ ) is a singleton if and only if f is incentive
compatible.
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Remark 3.4. Palfrey and Srivastava (1989) establish a very similar imple-
mentation result in their Theorem 2: any incentive compatible social choice
function is fully implementable in undominated Bayes Nash equilibrium. We
clarify a few differences between our result and that of Palfrey and Srivasta-
va (1989). Although Palfrey and Srivastava (1989) do not need ex post small
transfers, they use the integer games as part of their mechanism. On the other
hand, although our mechanism does not use any devices such as the integer
games, it exploits the power of ex post small transfers. In addition, our solu-
tion concept of S∞W is more robust (or permissive) than undominated Bayes
Nash equilibrium. Although Theorem 2 of Palfrey and Srivastava (1989) needs
at least three players, our result works even for the case of two players. One
common feature these two papers share is the difficulty of extending the results
to interdependent-value environments. The reader is referred to both Section
6.2 of our paper and Section 4 of Palfrey and Srivastava (1989) for appreciat-
ing this difficulty.
We use the following claim to prove the “if” part of Theorem 3.2.
Claim 3.5. Suppose that an SCF f is incentive compatible. For each k ≥
3, i ∈ I, and t¯i ∈ T¯i, if mi ∈ Ski (t¯i|M, T¯ ), then mk−3i = t¯i.
Proof. Consider type t¯i ∈ T¯i with θˆi(t¯i) = θ¯i. When k = 3, the result follows
from Claim 3.3. Fix k ≥ 3. The induction hypothesis is that for every i ∈ I,
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i = t¯i for all k
′ ≤ k − 3.
Then, we show that if mi ∈ Sk+1i (t¯i|M, T¯ ), then mk′i = t¯i for all k′ ≤ k−2.













We let M∗−i =
{
m−i ∈M−i : mk−2−i = m0−i
}
. Fix a conjecture ν : T¯−i →
∆(M−i). Note that, for each (t−i,m−i),





Thus, we obtain e (m−1,m0) = 0.



















ui(g(m˜i,m−i), θ¯i) + τi(m˜i,m−i)
}−{






ui(g(m˜i,m−i), θ¯i) + τi(m˜i,m−i)
}−{







ui(g(m˜i,m−i), θ¯i) + τi(m˜i,m−i)
}−{
ui(g(mi,m−i), θ¯i) + τi(mi,m−i)
} } ν(m−i|t−i)pii(t¯i)[t−i] > 0.
From the induction hypothesis, for every i ∈ I and t¯i ∈ T¯i, if mi ∈
Ski (t¯i|M, T¯ ), then mk′i = t¯i for all k′ ≤ k − 3. When m−i 6∈ M∗−i, there
exists some j ∈ I\{i} such that mk−1j = m0j . We compute the expected loss in
terms of payments for player i of type t¯i when playing mi rather than m˜i:
∑
t−i,m−i 6∈M∗−i
{τi (m˜i,m−i)− τi (m)} ν(m−i|t−i)pii(t¯i)[t−i]
By choosing m˜i rather than mi, player i will avoid the fine, η according to rule
dk−2i (see (3.5) in Section 3.1) and ξ according to rule di (see (3.4)), that is,
τi (m˜i,m−i)− τi (m) = η + ξ.













This means that the possible gain from playing mi rather than m˜i is bounded
by D/K.
Since we have that ξ > D/K (see (3.12) in Section 3.1), we have










ui(g(m˜i,m−i), θ¯i) + τi(m˜i,m−i)
}−{
ui(g(mi,m−i), θ¯i) + τi(mi,m−i)
} } ν(m−i|t−i)pii(t¯i)[t−i] > 0
When m−i ∈M∗−i, for any j ∈ I\{i}, we have mk−1j = m0j . From the induction






i = t¯i, for all
k′ ≤ k− 3. We compute the expected loss in terms of payments for player i of
type t¯i when playing mi rather than m˜i:
∑
t−i,m−i∈M∗−i
{τi (m˜i,m−i)− τi (m)} ν(m−i|t−i)pii(t¯i)[t−i]
By choosing m˜i rather than mi, player i will avoid the fine, η according to rule
dk−2i (see (3.5) in Section 3.1), the expected loss in terms of payments from
choosing mi rather than m˜i in terms of τ(·) (see (3.6) in Section 3.1) is
τi (m˜i,m−i)− τi (m)





Therefore, when playing mi rather than m˜i, the expected loss in terms of
payments is bounded below:
∑
t−i
{τi (m˜i,m−i)− τi (m)} pii(t¯i)[t−i] ≥ η.
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In terms of g(·) (see the outcome function in (3.3)), the possible gain for player







k−2), θ¯i)− ui(f(mk−2/m˜i), θ¯i)
}
pii(t¯i)[t−i],
Since m˜i differs from mi only in the (k − 2)th announcement.
That is, when playing mi rather than m˜i, the possible gain for player i of
type t¯i is which is bounded above by 0 from incentive compatibility of f. This
completes Step 2.
The “only if” part of Theorem 3.2 is proved as follows.
Proof. Fix τ¯ > 0 arbitrarily small. Given f : T¯ → ∆ (A) implementable in
S∞W with arbitrarily small transfers by a mechanism (M, τ¯), then for any
t ∈ T¯ and m ∈ S∞W (t|M, T¯ ), we have g(m) = f(t) and τ(m) < τ¯ . Since
S∞W
(
t|M, T¯ ) is a singleton, we know that S∞W is a pure Bayesian Nash





























Let (T¯ , f) be a direct revelation mechanism such that
f(ti, t−i) = g(mi (ti) ,m−i(t−i)),
τi(ti, t−i) = τi (mi (ti) ,m−i(t−i)) ,
where g and τ is specified in (M, τ¯) . Then truth telling must be a Bayesian

































Note that (3.22) holds for any τ¯ since from “if” part, given any τ¯ we can


















That is, f is incentive compatible.
3.4.3 Implementation with No Transfer
In Theorem 3.2, we use arbitrarily small transfers to achieve implementation
of any incentive compatible SCF. In the mechanism, the ex post payment,
although we can make it very small, is still necessary on the equilibrium. We




Recall the following definition: an SCF f : T¯ → ∆ (A) is implementable
in S∞W with no transfers if it is implementable in S∞W with arbitrar-
ily small transfers by a mechanism (M, τ¯) such that for any t ∈ T¯ and
m ∈ S∞W (t|M, T¯ ), τi(m) = 0 for each i ∈ I. To discuss the result with
no transfers, we need some extra assumptions. We first use non-exclusive in-
formation structure (NEI) for implementation with no transfers. To the best
of our knowledge, NEI is first proposed by Postlewaite and Schmeidler (1986).
We provide a version of its definition as follows:
Definition 3.6. The environment E satisfies the non-exclusive informa-
tion structure (NEI) if, for each t¯ ∈ T¯ , i, j ∈ I, and tj ∈ T¯j,
p¯ii(t¯i)[tj, t¯−ij] =
{
1 if tj = t¯j
0 otherwise
where t¯−ij denotes a type profile that is obtained from t¯ after eliminating t¯i
and t¯j.
When I = 2, NEI is equivalent to complete information. NEI captures
the idea that each agent is informationally negligible in the sense that any
unilateral deception from the truth-telling in the direct revelation mechanism
can be detected. Under NEI, we obtain the following result:
Theorem 3.3. Suppose that the environment E satisfies Assumptions 3.1 and
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NEI. Assume I ≥ 2. Any incentive compatible SCF is implementable in S∞W
with no transfers.
Proof. The mechanism is identical to the mechanism in Section 3.3.1 except




































−i ] = 0;
0 otherwise.
The proof then follows verbatim the proof of Theorem 3.2.
Strict Incentive Compatibility and Separability
Following Sjo¨stro¨m (1994), we introduce the following class of environments.
We assume the outcome space A = A1 ×A2 × ...×AI , and ui : Ai ×Θi → R.
For each SCF f and type t ∈ T¯ , we denote f(t) = (f1(t), . . . , fI(t)) where
fi(t) denotes the marginal distribution of f(t) on Ai where A = A1 × A2 ×
...× AI . The reader is referred to Sjo¨stro¨m (1994) to see when this separable
environment is valid. For example, we can consider an exchange economy
where each player i has a consumption set Ai and cares only about his own
consumption. We first introduce a stronger version of incentive compatibility.
Definition 3.7. An SCF f : T¯ → ∆(A) is strictly incentive compatible
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if, for all i ∈ I and all ti, t′i ∈ T¯i with ti 6= t′i,
∑
t−i∈T¯−i




In the theorem below, we can drop Assumption 2 but instead, we need to
strengthen incentive compatibility into strict incentive compatibility.
Theorem 3.4. Suppose that a separable environment E satisfies Assumptions
3.1. Assume I ≥ 2. Any strictly incentive compatible SCF is implementable
in S∞W with no transfers.
The corresponding mechanism is provided as follows. Basically, in a sepa-
rable environment, the strictly incentive compatible SCF replaces the role of
scoring rule (d0i ) in the previous discussion. We can drop the assumption on
information structure, that is, players’ information can be independent.
1. The message space:
Each player i makes 4 simultaneous announcements of his own type. We
index each announcement by −2,−1, 0, 1. That is, player i’s message
space is given as
Mi = M
−2

















) ∈M, mk = (mki )i∈I ∈Mk = ×i∈IMki .











2. The outcome function:
Let  be a small positive number.
Define e : M−1 ×M0 → R by
e(m−1,m0) =
{
 if m−1i 6= m0i for some i ∈ I,
0 otherwise.
The outcome function g : M → ∆(A) is defined as follows: for each
m ∈M ,













1− e (m−1,m0)}{λ˜1f˜(m−1,m−2) + λ˜2f˜(m0,m−1) + (1− λ˜1 − λ˜2)f(m1)} ,










−i ) denotes the
marginal distribution of f(mki ,m
k−1
−i ) on Ai for k ∈ {−1, 0}.
3. The transfer rule:
Let η be positive numbers. Player i is to pay η if his 1st round announce-













The definitions of E and D are the same as in the previous section.
We choose positive numbers λ˜1, λ˜2, , η such that for every ti, t
′
i ∈ T¯i and
every i ∈ I,





ui(fi(ti, t−i), θˆi(ti))− ui(fi(t′i, t−i), θˆi(ti))
]
p¯ii(ti) [t−i] > γ, for q ∈ {1, 2} ;
(3.26)
η > E + (1− λ˜1 − λ˜2)D; (3.27)
and
γ > E + (1− λ˜1 − λ˜2)D + η. (3.28)
Since f is strictly incentive compatible, the existence of γ is guaranteed in
(3.26).
Remark 3.5. In a separable environment, a proper adjustment of the weight
between the 0th round report and the 1st round report can decrease the payment
in a way that differs from that used in Abreu and Matsushima (1994). Specifi-
cally, given τ¯ , we can choose (1− λ˜1− λ˜2) small enough to make the weight of
the 1st round announcement small enough. Therefore, η can be chosen small
enough to prevent the deviation in the 1st round.
Remark 3.6. We omit the proof of Theorem 3.4 and rather provide a heuristic
argument of how the proof works. The first round deletion of weakly dominated
120
strategies is the same as the procedure in the proof of Claim 1. Second, to elicit
the true type profile in the −1th and 0th rounds, the constructed SCF f˜ works
in a similar way as the scoring rule (d0i ) did in the proofs of Claims 2 and
3. Specifically, the function f˜ is constructed such that each player i’s payoff
from f˜ is affected only by his own −1th (resp. 0th) round report and the other
players’ −2th (resp. −1th) round report. By the strict incentive compatibility,
each player will announce truthfully in the −1th (resp. 0th) round(given the
truth telling in the −2th (resp. −1th) reports for everyone). When all players
tell the truth in every round, the constructed function f˜ coincides with the SCF
f. This enables the mechanism to implement f without any ex post transfers.
Finally, the last round of elimination of strictly dominated strategies works in
a way that is parallel to the proof of Claim 4.
3.5 Applications
We now discuss the applications of our results. First, we connect our results to
continuous implementation, a concept proposed by Oury and Tercieux (2012).
In Section 5.1, we show that any incentive-compatible SCF is continuously
implementable with arbitrarily small transfers. Second, we discuss robust
undominated Nash implementation, which Chung and Ely (2003) call UNE-
implementation. Chung and Ely show that when UNE-implementation is
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defined to be robust to perturbations accommodating interdependent values,
Maskin monotonicity is a necessary condition. In contrast, when we require
UNE-implementation to be robust only to private-value perturbations, we
establish a very permissive result. That is, as long as we allow for a tiny number
of transfers out of equilibrium, any incentive-compatible SCF is shown to be
UNE-implementable. Finally, with ex post small transfers, we obtain a full
implementation result of the full surplus extraction in auctions environments.
3.5.1 Continuous Implementation
The mechanism design literature often deals with environments in which mon-
etary payments are available, and they are content to limit their analyses to
partial implementation. Partial implementation is a notion that requires the
planner to design a game in which only some equilibrium–but not necessarily
all equilibria–yields the desired outcome. Then, appealing to the revelation
principle, its analysis reduces to the characterization of incentive-compatible
direct revelation mechanisms. This means that the mechanism design liter-
ature discounts the possibility that undesirable equilibria exist in the game.
Full–as opposed to partial–implementation is a notion that requires that all
equilibria deliver the desired outcome. Although it is unfortunate that the
literature has thus far largely ignored the need to compare partial and full im-
plementation, Oury and Tercieux (2012) have recently built a bridge between
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these two notions. They consider the following situation: The planner wants
not only that the SCF be partially implementable, but also that it continue to
be partially implementable in all the models close to his initial model. That
is, the SCF is continuously (partial) implemented. Oury and Tercieux (2012)
show that Bayesian monotonicity (See definition on p. 1617 in Oury and Ter-
cieux (2012)), which is a necessary condition for full implementation, becomes
necessary even for continuous implementation; in light of this result, they argue
that continuous implementation is tightly connected to full implementation.
We shall show that as long as the planner is willing to allow for small ex
post transfers, any incentive-compatible SCF is continuously implementable
in private-values environments. This stands in sharp contrast with Oury and
Tercieux (2012) because our continuous implementation result does not need
Bayesian monotonicity but only incentive compatibility, which is a necessary
condition for partial implementation. Our result is consistent with Matsushi-
ma (1993), which shows that in Bayesian environments with side payments
under strict incentive compatibility, Bayesian monotonicity holds generically.
Therefore any incentive compatible SCF is fully implementable. Note that
if one is willing to settle for allowing small ex post transfers, one can always
transform any incentive-compatible SCF into a strict incentive-compatible one.
However, the mechanism which can fully implement any incentive-compatible
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SCF employs either large transfers (Matsushima (1991)) or infinite strategy
space (In the Bayesian environments with side payments, the set of allocation
rules is infinite in Jackson (1991)). We show that with arbitrarily small trans-
fers, any incentive-compatible SCF is fully implementable by a finite mecha-
nism, not only in the benchmark model but also in the nearby environment.
Given a mechanism (M, τ¯) and a type space T , we write U (M, τ¯ , T )
for the induced incomplete information game. In the game U (M, τ¯ , T ) , a
behavior strategy of a player i is any measurable function σi : Ti → ∆ (Mi) .
We follow Oury and Tercieux (2012) to write down the following definitions.
We define






σ−i(m−i|t−i) {ui(g(mi,m−i), θi(ti)) + τi(mi,m−i))} .
Definition 3.8. A profile of strategies σ = (σ1, ..., σI) is a Bayes Nash
equilibrium in U(M, τ¯ , T ) if, for each i ∈ I and each ti ∈ Ti,
mi ∈ supp (σi (ti))⇒ mi ∈ argmaxm′i∈MiVi ((m
′
i, σ−i) , ti) .
We write σ|T¯ for the strategy σ restricted to T¯ .
For any T = (Ti, θˆi, pii)i∈I , we will write T ⊃ T¯ if T ⊃ T¯ and for every




for any measurable E ⊂ T−i.
Definition 3.9. Fix a mechanism (M, τ¯) and a model T such that T¯ ⊂ T . We
say that a Bayes Nash equilibrium σ in U (M, τ¯ , T ) (strictly) continuously
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implements f : T¯ → ∆(A) if the following two conditions hold: (i) σ|T¯ is a
(strict) Bayes Nash equilibrium in U
(M, τ¯ , T¯ ); (ii) for any t¯ ∈ T¯ and any
sequence t[n]→p t¯, whenever t[n] ∈ T for each n, we have (g ◦σ)(t[n])→ f(t¯).
We introduce two variants of continuous implementation:
Definition 3.10. An SCF f : T¯ → ∆ (A) is continuously implementable with
transfers if there exists a mechanism (M, τ¯) such that for each model T with
T¯ ⊂ T , there is a Bayes Nash equilibrium σ in U(M, τ¯ , T ) that continuously
implements f .
Definition 3.11. An SCF f : T¯ → ∆ (A) is continuously implementable with
arbitrarily small transfers if for any τ¯ > 0, there exists a mechanism
(M, τ¯) such that for each model T with T¯ ⊂ T , there is a Bayes Nash equi-
librium σ in U (M, τ¯ , T ) that continuously implements f .
First, we establish the following important lemma.
Lemma 3.3. Fix any model T such that T¯ ⊂ T . There exists a finite mecha-
nism M. For any t¯ ∈ T¯ and any sequence {t [n]}∞n=0 in T, if t [n]→p t¯, then,
for each n large enough, we have S∞W (t[n]|M, T ) ⊂ S∞W (t¯|M, T ).
Let M be any one of the mechanisms used in Section 3.4. The proof of
Lemma 3.3 builds upon the following claims.
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Claim 3.6. Fix any model T such that T¯ ⊂ T . For any t¯ ∈ T¯ and any
sequence {t[n]}∞n=0 such that t [n]→p t¯, there exists N1 ∈ N such that for any
n ≥ N1, we have if mi ∈ W 1i (ti [n] |M, T ), then m−2i = t¯i.
Proof. Fix t¯ ∈ T¯ . Let {t[n]}∞n=0 be such that t [n]→p t¯. There exists a natural
number N1 ∈ N such that for each n > N1, we have θˆi (ti [n]) = θˆi(t¯i) = θ¯i
for some θ¯i ∈ Θi. This is due to the fact that Θi is finite and endowed with
the discrete topology. It follows immediately from Claim 3.1 that if m−2i 6= t¯i,
then mi 6∈ W 1i (ti [n] |M, T ) .
Fix a mechanism (M, τ¯) and a type space T¯ . For any t¯ ∈ T¯ , we define a

















is defined in the same

























Fix any model T such that T¯ ⊂ T , and a finite mechanism M, for any
t¯ ∈ T¯ and any sequence {t [n]}∞n=0 in T such that t [n] →p t¯, for any n > N1,
S∞W (t[n]|M, T ) ⊂ S∞W˜ (t [n] |M, T¯ ) by Claim 3.6.
Claim 3.7. Fix any model T such that T¯ ⊂ T , there exists a finite mechanism
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M. For any t¯ ∈ T¯ and any sequence {t [n]}∞n=0 in T such that t [n] →p t¯, for
each n large enough, we have S∞W (t[n]|M, T ) ⊂ S∞W (t¯|M, T ).
Proof. From Claims 2, 3, and 5 in Section 3.3, we know that for any t¯ ∈ T¯ ,
S∞W˜ (t¯|M, T¯ ) = {(t¯, ..., t¯)} . Therefore, S∞W (t¯|M, T¯ ) = S∞W˜ (t¯|M, T¯ ). So
it suffices to show for each n large enough, S∞W (t[n]|M, T ) ⊂ S∞W˜ (t [n] |M, T ) .
That follows from showing that for each t¯ ∈ T¯ and sequence {t [n]}∞n=0 in
T such that t[n] →p t¯ as n → ∞, there exists a natural number Nk ∈ N such
that, for any n ≥ Nk, we have Sk (t [n] |M, T ) ⊂ Sk(t¯|M, T ), for all k. We
prove this by induction. From Claim 3.6, we know that for any large enough
n, θˆi (ti [n]) = θˆi(t¯i) = θ¯i for some θ¯i ∈ Θi. We fix such large n. By definition,
mi ∈ W˜i (ti [n] |M, T ) then m−2i = t¯i. Thus, S1 (t [n] |M, T ) ⊂ W˜ 1(t¯|M, T ).
Suppose the claim is true for any k > 1. We then show that it is also valid for
k + 1.
Fix mi ∈ Sk+1i (ti[n]|M, T ). Recall the notation in Section 2.2. Then, for
any m′i, there exists some ν



























For any mi and m
′
i, we define β
mi,m
′
i : T−i →M−i such that, for any t−i,
βmi,m
′
i (t−i) = arg max
m−i∈Sk−i(t−i|M,T )
{Vi (mi,m−i)− Vi (m′i,m−i)} .
We can interpret βmi,m
′
i as player i’s belief about the best possible scenario
for the choice of mi against m
′
i where other players use k-times iteratively






















{t−i ∈ T−i : βmi,m′i (t−i) = m−i}
]
.
Note that this is where the assumption of private values becomes crucial. Since
t [n]→p t¯, for any n > 0, there exists εn > 0,
pii (ti [n]) [(t¯−i)
εn ]→ pii (t¯i) [t¯−i] , as n→∞,
where (t¯−i)εn denotes an open ball consisting of the set of types t−i whose
(k − 1)-order beliefs are εn-close to those of types t¯−i.6 It follows that the
following probability is well defined.
For any t¯−i ∈ T¯−i such that pii (t¯i) [t¯−i] > 0, and m−i, we define the follow-
ing:








6This follows from the fact that the Prohorov distance between ti [n] and t¯i converges to
0 due to the finiteness of T¯−i. See Dudley (2002, pp. 398 and 411).
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Now we construct a conjecture ν : T¯−i → ∆(M−i) for type t¯i. For any





ui(g(mi,m−i), θ¯i) + τi (mi,m−i)
] ∑
t¯−i∈T


























i,m−i), θ¯i) + τi (mi,m−i)
]
ν(m−i|t¯−i)pii(t¯i)[t¯−i]
By construction, ν(m−i|t¯−i)pii(t¯i)[t¯−i] > 0 implies thatm−i ∈ Sk−i(t−i [n] |M, T ).
By our induction hypothesis, Sk−i(t−i [n] |M, T ) ⊂ Sk−i(t¯−i|M, T ). Thus, we
have m−i ∈ Sk−i(t¯−i|M, T ). Since the choice of m′i is arbitrary, so this com-
pletes the proof.
If we do not impose any conditions on the size of ex post transfers, we
obtain the following very permissive result.
Theorem 3.5. Suppose that the environment E satisfies Assumptions 3.1 and
3.2. Assume I ≥ 2. Any SCF f is continuously implementable with transfers.
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Proof. We employ the mechanism (M, τ¯) constructed in Section 2.1 and let
K = 1. Therefore, for all t¯ ∈ T¯ , m ∈ S∞W (t¯|M, T¯ ) ⇒ g (m) = f (t¯) . Note
that S∞W
(
t¯|M, T¯ ) = {(t¯, ..., t¯)} . We write σ∗ such that σ∗i (t¯i) = (t¯i, ..., t¯i)
for all t¯i ∈ T¯i. Now pick any T such that T¯ ⊂ T . It is well known that
a trembling hand perfect equilibrium7 is always contained in S∞W . There-
fore, σ∗ is a trembling hand perfect equilibrium in U
(M, τ¯ , T¯ ) . We show
that there exists an equilibrium that continuously implements f on T¯ . For
each player i and each type t¯i ∈ T¯i, restrict the space of strategies of play-
er i by assuming that σi (t¯i) = σ
∗
i (t¯i) for each t¯i ∈ T¯i. Because M is finite
and T is countable, standard arguments (see footnote 1 of online appendix
of Oury and Tercieux (2012)) show that there exists a Bayes Nash equilib-
rium in U(M, τ¯ , T ), which is denoted by σ. Thus, σ is a Bayes Nash equi-
librium in U(M, τ¯ , T ) and σ|T¯ is a Bayes Nash equilibrium in U
(M, τ¯ , T¯ ) .
Now, pick any sequence {t [n]}∞n=0 such that t [n] →p t¯. It is clear that, for
each n : Supp(σ (t [n])) ⊂ S∞W (t [n] |M, T ) . In addition, for n large enough,
we know by Lemma 3.3 that S∞W (t [n] |M, T ) ⊂ S∞W (t¯|M, T¯ ) and so,
(g ◦ σ)(t[n]) = f(t¯) as claimed.
7We follow Osborne and Rubinstein (1994) and provide a version in our contex-
t. A profile of strategies σ = (σ1, ..., σI) is a trembling hand perfect equilibrium in















, for every k.
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It is often unrealistic to assume that the mechanism can induce very large
transfers even out of equilibrium. Therefore, we obtain the following charac-
terization of continuous implementation with arbitrarily small transfers.
Theorem 3.6. Suppose that the environment E satisfies Assumptions 3.1 and
3.2. Assume I ≥ 2. An SCF f is continuously implementable with arbitrarily
small transfers if and only if f is incentive compatible.
Proof. For any τ¯ > 0, we employ the mechanism (M, τ¯) constructed in Section
2.1. The proof for “if” part is parallel to the proof of Theorem 3.5.
The “only if” part is proved as follows: Given f is continuously imple-
mentable with arbitrarily small transfers. Then, for any τ > 0, there is a
Bayes Nash equilibrium σ in U(M, T¯ ) such that (g ◦ σ)(t¯) = f(t¯) for any
t¯ ∈ T¯ and τ(σ(t¯)) < τ¯. By a similar argument in the proof of the “only if”
part of Theorem 3.2, we conclude that f is incentive compatible.
The next result is one of the main results of Oury and Tercieux (2012).
Proposition 3.1 (Theorem 2 of Oury and Tercieux (2012)). If an SCF f is
strictly continuously implementable, it satisfies strict Bayesian monotonicity.
Oury and Tercieux show that the condition for full implementation (i.e.,
Bayesian monotonicity) is necessary for “strict” continuous partial implemen-
tation. To drop this “strictness,” they assume instead that sending messages in
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the mechanism is slightly costly. Recall that our mechanism exploits the weak
dominance in round -2 announcement. This weak dominance will be highly
sensitive to payoff perturbations that are induced by the cost of sending mes-
sages. Therefore, Oury and Tercieux’s argument cannot apply here; as a result
the relation between Bayesian monotonicity and continuous implementation
disappears. However, as long as we allow for ex post small transfers and con-
sider private-values environments, we obtain yet another result that permits
continuous implementation and our result is as permissive as it can be. Oury
and Tercieux’s result also holds in any interdependent-value environments,
while our result can be extended to a particular class of interdependent-value
environments (see the discussion in Section 6.2).
3.5.2 UNE Implementation
Chung and Ely (2003) contemplate the following situation: if a planner wants
all equilibria of his mechanism yield a desired outcome, and if he entertains
the possibility that players may have even the slightest uncertainty about pay-
offs, then the planner should insist on a solution concept with a closed graph.
Chung and Ely then adopt undominated Nash equilibrium as a solution con-
cept and call the corresponding implementation concept “UNE implementa-
tion”. In particular, Theorem 1 of Chung and Ely (2003) shows that Maskin
monotonicity is a necessary condition for UNE implementation. For this
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proof, one needs to construct a near-complete information structure in which
some players have superior information about the state, and consequently,
about the preferences of other players. In their Section 6.2, Chung and Ely
restrict their attention to private-value perturbations8 in which each type may
be uncertain about the preferences of other players but always knows his own
preferences. Under such perturbations, they show that dominated strategies
under complete information continue to be dominated.
In their footnote 7 Chung and Ely (2003) observe that the continuity of
dominated strategies under private-value perturbations does not necessarily
guarantee that UNE implementation suffices for UNE-implementation. In
fact, we provide an affirmative answer to Chung and Ely’s question. That is,
our robustness argument can be adapted to prove that the mechanism provid-
ed in Abreu and Matsushima (1994) actually achieves UNE implementation.
Thus, if we consider private-value environments and allow for small ex post
transfers, we provide a permissive result for UNE-implementation.
Following Chung and Ely (2003), we now rephrase their definition of UNE-
implementation.
Definition 3.12. Fix a mechanism (M, τ¯) and a complete-information model
T¯ . We say that (M, τ¯) UNE-implements f : T¯ → ∆(A) if the following two
8The perturbation in Chung and Ely (2003) is a special case of the perturbation defined
in a universal type space that we formulate here.
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conditions hold: (i) there exists a strategy profile σ such that σ|T¯ is an un-
dominated Nash equilibrium in U
(M, τ¯ , T¯ ); (ii) for any t¯ ∈ T¯ , any sequence
t[n]→p t¯, any model T with T¯ ⊂ T , and any sequence of undominated Bayes
Nash equilibria {σn}∞n=0 of the game U(M, τ¯ , T ), whenever t[n] ∈ T for each
n, we have g(σn(t[n]))→ f(t¯).
Note that any complete-information model is a special case of an incomplete-
information model. By Theorem 3.5, we record the following result:
Corollary 3.1. Suppose that the environment E satisfies Assumption 3.1 and
T¯ is a complete-information model. Assume I ≥ 2. Any SCF f is UNE-
implementable with transfers.
More importantly, we obtain the following permissive result:
Corollary 3.2. Suppose that the environment E satisfies Assumption 3.1 and
T¯ is a complete-information model. Assume I ≥ 2. Any incentive-compatible
SCF f is UNE-implementable with no transfers.
Remark 3.7. Assume that there are at least three players. In this case, under
complete information, the planner can always detect any unilateral deviation
from a truthful announcement. Therefore, we simply construct a new SCF
that is the same as the original SCF, except that we simply ignore any such
unilateral deviation and assign the same lottery as if there were no deviation-
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s. This new SCF is equivalent to the original SCF under the hypothesis of
complete information so that we can make any SCF be incentive-compatible.
So, when I ≥ 3, we can drop incentive compatibility completely from Corollary
3.2. In fact, this is the main result of Abreu and Matsushima (1994). The
novel contribution here is to observe that the result of Abreu and Matsushima
(1994) can be adapted to establish UNE-implementation.
Proof. Note that complete-information environments trivially satisfy NEI (non-
exclusive information) assumption. So, we modify the scoring rule d0i as we
did for Theorem 3.2. The rest of the proof is completed by Theorem 3.6.
Our result is consistent with Chung and Ely (2003). Theorem 1 of Chung
and Ely (2003) shows that Maskin monotonicity is a necessary condition for
UNE-implementation. Specifically, for the proof of this theorem, one needs
to exploit the interdependent values. It is also easy to show that Maskin
monotonicity is still necessary for UNE-implementation if players are not
very sure about their own payoff type in the case of private values. In the
present paper, we assume private values and it is also possible to extend our
continuous implementation result to a particular class of interdependent-value
environments. In Section 6.2 below, we elaborate more on the difficulty of
extending our results to general interdependent-value environments.
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3.5.3 Full Surplus Extraction
In a seminal paper, Cre´mer and McLean (1988) show that in a single object
auction with generic correlated types, it is possible to design a mechanism
(which we call a CM mechanism) in such a way that (i) each bidder earns an
expected surplus of zero in a Bayes Nash equilibrium and (ii) the object is
allocated to the agent with the highest valuation. This outcome is referred
to as the full surplus extraction (henceforth, FSE) outcome. Although this
is a surprisingly positive result, an FSE outcome is rarely observed in reality.
Many explanations have been proposed to resolve this discrepancy between
theory and reality, including risk neutrality, unlimited liability, the absence of
collusion among agents, a lack of competition among sellers, and the restric-
tiveness of a fixed finite type space. Although these are important issues, we
rather follow Brusco (1998) who points out another weakness of the FSE re-
sult. In particular, Brusco provides an example in which every mechanism has
the FSE property as a Bayes Nash equilibrium must have another Bayes Nash
equilibrium which is weakly Pareto superior for the agents. This implies that
the multiplicity of equilibria might be a reason why the FSE outcome is not
observed in reality, despite the fact that the FSE outcome is an equilibrium in
dominant strategies. Brusco shows that one can devise a two-stage sequential
mechanism that implements the FSE outcome in all perfect Bayesian equilib-
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ria. Chen and Xiong (2013) show that the FSE outcome is virtually Bayesian
fully implemented.
We can establish a similar result, by adopting a static mechanism to achieve
full implementation, as long as players do not use weakly dominated strategies.
First, we include the range of payment schemes of the CM mechanism as part
of A (the set of pure outcomes). Second, following Cre´mer and McLean (1988),
we observe that the social choice function that achieves the FSE outcome is
Bayesian incentive compatible, i.e., incentive compatible.9 So, by Theorem
3.2, we obtain the following:
Corollary 3.3. Suppose that the environment E satisfies Assumptions 1 and
2. Assume I ≥ 2. The FSE outcome is implementable in S∞W with arbitrarily
small transfers.
Therefore, we still obtain the FSE property even when we insist on full
implementation with small transfers. Note that we achieve full implementation
in a finite mechanism, whereas the mechanisms in Brusco (1998) and Chen
and Xiong (2013) are infinite and involve either integer games or an “open set
trick.” One crucial assumption that we adopt for this result is that no players
9Cre´mer and McLean (1988) show two main results: their Theorem 1 achieves FSE in
dominant-strategy incentive-compatibility when agents’ beliefs satisfy a full-rank condition,
whereas their Theorem 2 achieves FSE in Bayesian incentive-compatibility when agents’
beliefs satisfy a weaker spanning condition. Corollary 3.3 therefore strengthens only their
Theorem 2, while the results in Brusco (1998) and Chen and Xiong (2013) apply to their
Theorem 1 as well.
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use weakly dominated actions.
3.6 Discussion
Throughout our argument, the dominance is always strict except in round −2.
In Section 6.1, we introduce the concept of partial honesty and propose a way
of making the dominance in round −2 “strict.” This allows us to connect our
results to rationalizable implementation. In Section 6.2, we provide a sufficient
condition for our results in interdependent-value environments.
3.6.1 The Role of Honesty and Rationalizable Imple-
mentation
Following Matsushima (2008) and Dutta and Sen (2012), we depart from the
assumption that all players are motivated solely by their self-interest and in-
stead assume that they all have a small intrinsic preference for honesty. This
implies that such players have preferences not just on outcomes but also di-
rectly on the messages that they are required to send to the planner.
Fix the mechanism Γ = (M, τ¯) that we constructed in Section 3. First,
recall that each player i’s preferences are given by ui : ∆(A) × Θi → R.
Following the setup of Dutta and Sen (2012), we extend this ui(·) to vi : M ×
Θi → R satisfying the following two properties: for all T¯ = (T¯i, θˆi, pii)i∈I , i ∈
I, t = (ti, t−i) ∈ T¯ , mi, m˜i,∈Mi, and m−i ∈M−i:
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1. If ui(g(mi,m−i), θˆi(ti)) ≥ ui(g(m˜i,m−i), θˆi(ti)), m−1i = ti, and m˜−1i 6= ti,
then
vi((mi,m−i), θˆi(ti)) > vi((m˜i,m−i), θˆi(ti)).
2. In all other cases, vi((mi,m−i), θˆi(ti)) ≥ vi((m˜i,m−i), θˆi(ti)) if and only if
ui(g(mi,m−i), θˆi(ti)) ≥ ui(g(m˜i,m−i), θˆi(ti)).
The first part of the definition captures an individual’s preference for partial
honesty. That is, he strictly prefers (mi,m−i) to (m˜i,m−i) only if he thinks
g(mi,m−i) is at least as good as g(m˜i,m−i). We consider this to be a very
weak assumption, and this weakness makes the concept of partial honesty
particularly compelling. If all players are partially honest in this sense, we
can conclude that any message containing truth-telling in round −2 strictly
dominates any other message containing non-truth telling in round −2. Hence,
given partial honesty, every dominance becomes strict in our mechanism. This
means that we can improve upon our previous results by replacing S∞W
with S∞, which is the (interim correlated) rationalizability correspondence,
which maps each type profile to the set of message profiles that survive the
iterated deletion of never best responses.10 By Claim 7, we know that this
10In finite games, it is well known that an action is strictly dominated if and only if it is
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rationalizability correspondence is upper hemi-continuous. Hence, we obtain
the following result:
Proposition 3.2. Suppose that the environment E satisfies Assumptions 3.1
and 3.2. Assume I ≥ 2. Assume further that all agents are partially honest.
Then, any incentive-compatible SCF is implementable in S∞ with arbitrarily
small transfers. Moreover, any incentive-compatible SCF is “strictly continu-
ously” implementable with arbitrarily small transfers.
Proof. We simply combine all the arguments we made above for Theorems 2
and 5. This completes the proof.
Oury and Tercieux (2012) show in their Theorem 4 that an SCF f is contin-
uously implementable by a finite mechanism if and only if it is implementable
in rationalizable strategies by a finite mechanism. Although they do not need
ex post payments or partial honesty, without either of these we know of no
rationalizable implementation result with finite mechanism. For any SCF f ,
we denote by f τ the augmentation of f by ex post transfers τ . We interpret
f τ as an SCF that is very close to f . We show that when all players are par-
tially honest and an SCF f is incentive compatible, then f τ is implementable
in rationalizable strategies by a finite mechanism. Kunimoto and Serrano
a never best response.
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(2014) show that if an SCF is implementable in rationalizable strategies by a
finite mechanism, it satisfies interim rationalizable monotonicity. Combining
these results, we conclude that when all agents are partially honest, for any
incentive compatible SCF f , one can find a nearby SCF f τ such that f τ is
implementable in rationalizable strategies by a finite mechanism if and only if
it satisfies interim rationalizable monotonicity.
Since interim rationalizable monotonicity implies Bayesian monotonicity
(see Kunimoto and Serrano (2014)), as long as all agents are partially honest
and the planner can allow a tiny number of ex post transfers in designing the
mechanism, Bayesian monotonicity or any version of monotonicity condition
can be fully dispensed with for continuous implementation. However, this
argument applies only to private-value environments. In the next subsection,
we discuss to which extend we can extend our results to interdependent-value
environments.
Matsushima (2008) imposes more stringent structures on the players’ cost
function of sending messages than our partial honesty so that he can take care
of fully interdependent values. We believe that one of the strongest assump-
tions he made was that the cost of sending messages depends on the propor-
tion of a player’s dishonest announcements. This assumption is very specific
to the construction of our mechanism and that in Matsushima (2008) (and
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thus, to basically any mechanism that resembles the Abreu-Matsushima type
of construction) in the sense that each player is required to make a number of
announcements of his type in the mechanism. In other words, Matsushima’s
assumption no longer makes sense once we adopt a different construction of
the mechanism, according to which all players are not necessarily required to
report their types many times. Nevertheless, the concept of partial honesty
can still be valid as long as the messages in the mechanism contain the play-
ers’ types. The lesson we draw here is that there seems to be a clear trade-off
between the permissiveness of implementation results and more structures in
regard to the cost function of sending messages.
3.6.2 Private Values vs. Interdependent Values
We now deal with the case of interdependent-value environments in which each
player i’s utility function is defined as ui : A×Θ→ R. This section is organized
as follows: we first provide a class of interdependent-value environments to
which all our results in private-value environments can be extended. Such
an environment is said to satisfy Condition (S). Second, we elaborate on
the implications of Condition (S). Finally, we show by example that our
mechanism fails to work when Condition (S) is violated. We thus conclude
that we need a completely different mechanism if we want to deal with more
general interdependent-value environments.
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Condition (S) We say that an environment E satisfies Condition (S) if, for
each i ∈ I, there exist a function xi : T¯i → ∆(A) and ζ > 0 such that
for all ti, t
′
i ∈ T¯i with ti 6= t′i and t−i ∈ T¯−i,
ui(xi(ti), (θˆi(ti), θˆ−i(t−i)))− ui(xi(t′i), (θˆi(ti), θˆ−i(t−i))) > ζ. (3.30)
Although we can extend all our results to interdependent-value environ-
ments satisfying Condition (S), we restrict our discussion here to the extension
of Theorem 2.11
Proposition 3.3. Suppose that the environment E satisfies Condition (S) and
Assumption 3.2. Assume I ≥ 2. An SCF f is implementable in S∞W with
arbitrarily small transfers where S∞W (t|M, T¯ ) is a singleton for each t ∈ T¯
if and only if it is incentive compatible.
Proof. We only focus on the if-part of Theorem 2. From the proof of the
Theorem 2, we observe that the proof of Claim 1 exploits the private-value
assumption, while Claims 2, 3, and 5 hold even in interdependent-value envi-
ronments. Therefore, it suffices to show that Claim 1 still holds here.
In this class of interdependent-value environments,
{
ui(xi(t¯i), θ¯i)− ui(xi(m−2i ), θ¯i)
}
in (3.14) is replaced by
ui(xi(ti), (θˆi(ti), θˆ−i(t−i)))− ui(xi(t′i), (θˆi(ti), θˆ−i(t−i))).
11This restriction is justified because one can easily see that all other results of our paper
crucially rely on the validity of Theorem 2. Note also that Theorem 1 can be seen as a
special case of Theorem 2.
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By inequality (3.30), the last inequality in (3.14) is strict whenever e(m−1,m0) =
 for some m−i. This completes the proof.
To illustrate the strength of Condition (S), we use the concept of type
diversity, which is introduced by Serrano and Vohra (2005). Type diversity is
a natural counterpart of Assumption 1 in interdependent-value environments.
To define type diversity, I need to introduce some notation. Let A be a
finite set of alternatives. For each a ∈ A and i ∈ I, define uai (ti) to be the
interim utility of player i of type ti ∈ T¯i for a constant lottery which assigns a







Let uAi (ti) = (u
a
i (ti))a∈A
Assumption 3.3. The environment E satisfies type diversity if the following
two properties hold12:
1. there does not exist i ∈ I, and ti, t′i ∈ T¯i with ti 6= t′i such that





12To be precise, the second property of our type diversity was not included in its original
definition of Serrano and Vohra (2005). Thus, our version of type diversity is slightly stronger
than theirs.
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for some α > 0 and β ∈ R.
2. for every i ∈ I and ti ∈ T¯i, there exist a, a′ ∈ A such that
uai (ti) 6= ua
′
i (ti).
Serrano and Vohra (2005) establish the following lemma, which can be
considered an extension of Lemma 1 of the current paper.
Lemma 3.4. (Serrano and Vohra (2005)) Suppose that the environment E
satisfies Assumption 3.3. Then, for each i ∈ I, there exists a function xi :













where h1i (ti) ∈ ∆(Θ) denotes the first-order belief of type ti.
Remark 3.8. It is easy to see that Condition (S) implies type diversity.
In Example 3.1 below, we will construct an interdependent-value environ-
ment satisfying type diversity but violating Condition (S) in which there exists
a message profile in S∞W but it induces an outcome different from the one
specified by the social choice function. The main difficulty lies in eliciting each
player’s true type in round -2 announcement.
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Example 3.1. A = {a1, a2}; I = {1, 2, 3}; T¯i = {t1i , t2i } for all i ∈ I. Define
a1 ≡ (1, 0); a2 ≡ (0, 1); t1i ≡ (1, 0); and t2i ≡ (0, 1). Let 3 + 1 ≡ 1. Let




be player i’s interim belief map from T¯i → ∆(T¯−i) :
pii(ti)[t−i] =
{
2/3 if ti+1 = ti+2 = ti;
1/3 if ti+1 = ti+2 6= ti.
That is, in player i’s view, player (i + 1)’s type and player (i + 2)’s type are
perfectly correlated but they are only partially correlated with player i’s type.
Each player i has the following preferences: for any a ∈ A and t ∈ T¯ ,
ui(a, t) = (1− δ)× a · ti + δ × a · ti+1,
where δ ∈ [0, 1] and a · ti denotes the dot (or, inner) product of the two vectors
a and ti. That is, player i’s preferences depend on his own type and player
(i+ 1)’s type, but not depend on player (i+ 2)’s type.
Consider the following incentive-compatible social choice function f ∗ : T¯ →
∆(A): for any t ∈ T¯ , f ∗(t) = a if and only if there exists a ∈ A such that
#{i ∈ I : ti = a} ≥ 2. We can interpret this f ∗ as the majority rule.
We parameterize the class of environments by the value of δ ∈ [0, 1]: when
δ = 0, the environment corresponds to a private-value one and also satisfies
Assumptions 1 and 2 so that our mechanism can implement f ∗; When δ ∈
(0, 1/2), it corresponds to an interdependent-value environment which satisfies
Condition (S) and Assumption 2 so that our mechanism can implement f ∗;
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and when δ ∈ [1/2, 1], it corresponds to an interdependent-value environment
which satisfies Assumptions 2 and 3, but violates Condition (S).
Consider Example 1 with δ = 1. By Lemma 3.4, we can find a set of lotteries
{xi(ti)}ti∈T¯i,i∈I satisfying inequality (3.31). Therefore, for any τ¯ > 0, we can
adopt the corresponding mechanism (M, τ¯) defined in Section 3.3.1 with this
set of lotteries. We claim that in the case of δ = 1, the mechanism generates a
strategy profile which survives S∞W but induces an outcome which is “not”
consistent with the one specified by the SCF f ∗. This shows some difficulty
of extending our results to general interdependent-value environments. We
formally state this claim as follows:
Claim 3.8. Consider Example 1 with δ = 1. Fix any set of lotteries {xi(ti)}ti∈T¯i,i∈I
satisfying inequality (3.31) and the corresponding mechanism (M, τ¯) defined
in Section 3.3.1. For any i ∈ I and any ti ∈ T¯i, we have that (t′i, . . . , t′i) ∈
S∞i Wi(ti|M, T¯ ) where t′i 6= ti.
Proof. See Appendix A.2.
In their Theorem 4 Oury and Tercieux (2012) show that a social choice
function f is continuously implementable by a finite mechanism if and only if
it is implementable in rationalizable strategies by a finite mechanism. They
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do not need any ex post payment, but assume that sending messages in the
mechanism is (slightly) costly. We assume that sending messages is costless,
but allow for small transfers. We show that all of our results can be extended
to the class of interdependent-value environments which satisfy Condition (S).
Bergemann and Morris (2009) show that their robust measurability, which
is a necessary condition for robust virtual implementation, is closely connect-
ed to the degree of interdependence of preferences. They also show that ro-
bust measurability is equivalent to requiring that the notion of measurabil-
ity originally suggested by Abreu and Matsushima (1992b)–henceforth, AM
measurability–holds on the union of all type spaces. Following this idea, in
our paper, AM measurability must be a necessary condition for (full) exact
rationalizable implementation in interdependent value environment.
This example satisfies type diversity. Under type diversity, we know that
every social choice function satisfies AM measurability (see Serrano and Vohra
(2005)). This means that the difficulty we encounter here has nothing to
do with the measurability condition. In other words, we must seek another
explanation if we consider (full) exact implementation, not virtual one.13
13For example, Artemov et al. (2013) show that robust measurability almost always be-
comes a vacuous constraint for robust virtual implementation. This seems to be consistent
with our finding in this example: AM measurability has nothing to do with the problem of
interdependent preferences, while Condition (S) indeed does.
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3.6.3 Budget Balance
Assume I ≥ 3. By constructing d0i under a stronger (and yet still generic)
version of Assumption 2, following d’Aspremont et al. (2003), we can achieve
budget balance for d0i . By allocating all the other transfers only across a-
gents, we can achieve budget balance everywhere (both on and off the solution
outcome).
3.6.4 Implementation with Arbitrarily Small Transfers
vs. Virtual Implementation
Virtual implementation means that the planner contents himself with imple-
menting the social choice rule with arbitrarily high probability. For example,
under complete information, Abreu and Sen (1991), Abreu and Matsushima
(1992a), and Matsushima (1988) all show that essentially any SCF is virtu-
ally implementable. While virtual implementation provides for an impressive
conclusion, it comes at the expense of some assumptions. In virtual imple-
mentation, the planner is willing to settle for implementing something that
is ε-close to the SCF. This implies that the planner is considered capable of
committing to any mechanism, which might assign a very bad outcome with
probability ε. In order for this argument to work, players must take these
small probabilities seriously and base decisions on them, with the rational ex-
pectation that these outcomes will be enforced if they happen to be selected
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by the mechanism. If we interpret a mechanism as a contract between the
two parties, it is natural to worry about the possibility of renegotiation and
seek to design renegotiation-proof mechanisms. This argument leads us to the
conclusion that virtual implementation will not be renegotiation-proof, which
potentially upsets its very permissive results. When we are satisfied with virtu-
al implementation, we might simply overlook a big cost of designing a credible
mechanism.
We propose the concept of implementation with arbitrarily small transfers;
this is another concept of approximate implementation, very much like virtual
implementation. The key feature of our mechanism, however, is that undesir-
able outcomes never occur with positive probability. Indeed, we need ex post
transfers but we can make them arbitrarily small. This makes our mechanism
less susceptible to renegotiation and therefore more credible.
.1 Appendix
There are two subsections in the appendix. In Section A.1, we show that our
mechanism also works under iterative deletion of weakly dominated strategies,
i.e., W∞ and moreover, the order of removal of strategies in W∞ is irrelevant
in our mechanism. In Section A.2, we prove the claim we have made in the
argument in Example 1 of Section 6.2.
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.1.1 Order Independence
We now define the process of iterative removal of weakly dominated strate-
gies. We seek to define mechanisms for which the order of removal of weakly
dominated strategies is irrelevant, that is, given an arbitrary type profile, any
message profile in the set of iteratively weakly undominated strategies can im-
plement the socially desired outcome at that type profile. Given a mechanism
M, let U(M, T¯ ) denote an incomplete information game associated with a
model T¯ . Fix a game U(M, T¯ ), player i ∈ I and type t¯i ∈ T¯i. Let H be a
profile of correspondences (Hi)i∈I where Hi is a mapping from T¯i to a subset of
Mi. A message mi ∈ Hi (t¯i) is weakly dominated with respect to H for player














ui(g(mi, σ−i (t−i)), θˆi(ti)) + τi (mi, σ−i (t−i))
]
pii (ti) [t−i]
for all σ−i : T¯−i → M−i such that σ−i (t−i) ∈ H−i (t−i) and a strict inequality











= Mi; (ii) any mi ∈ W k+1i
(
t¯i|M, T¯
) \W ki (t¯i|M, T¯ ) is weak-
ly dominated with respect to W k for player i of type t¯i; (iii) any mi ∈
14We consider player i’s belief over other players’ pure strategies. However, this formula-
tion is equivalent to taking player i’s belief as a conjecture over other players’ (correlated)






is weakly undominated with respect to W∞ for player i of
type t¯i where W
∞




i (t¯i|M, T¯ ).
Let W∞
(





is nonempty for any k. Thus, W∞ is nonempty-valued. Note
that W∞
(
t¯|M, T¯ ) depends on the sequence {W k}∞
k=0
. However, we will show
that for any t ∈ T¯ and m ∈ W∞ (t|M, T¯ ), we have g(m) = f(t). That is, the
socially desired outcome achieved in W∞ is obtained by any elimination order.
We first establish the following claim.
Claim .9. Assume that the environment E satisfies Assumption 2. For γ′ > 0,




i ∈ T¯i with








σˆ−2−i (t−i) , t
′
i
)− d0i (σˆ−2−i (t−i) , t′′i )] pii (ti) [t−i]
∣∣∣∣∣∣ > γ′. (32)
Proof. Fix any i. Let
D0i =
d0i ∈ RT¯ : ∑
t−i∈T¯−i
[
d0i (t−i, ti)− d0i (t−i, t′i)
]
p¯ii (ti) [t−i] > 0, ∀ti 6= t′i
 .
D0i is the set of proper scoring rules in RT¯ . By Lemma 2, D0i is a nonempty
open set. Let
I0i =





σˆ−2−i (t−i) , t
′
i
)− d0i (σˆ−2−i (t−i) , t′′i )] p¯ii (ti) [t−i] 6= 0,∀ti 6= t′i,∀σˆ−2−i
 .






i ∩ I0i ) has a positive measure in RT¯ . Thus we can find
a proper scoring rule d0i such that for any σˆ
−2
−i : T¯−i → T¯−i and t′i, t′′i ∈ T¯i with






σˆ−2−i (t−i) , t
′
i
)− d0i (σˆ−2−i (t−i) , t′′i )] pii (ti) [t−i] 6= 0.
Finally, since T¯ is finite, for any γ′ > 0, we can find some λ > 0 such that
for any σˆ−2−i : T¯−i → T¯−i and t′i, t′′i ∈ T¯i with t′i 6= t′′i , inequality (B.1) holds.
Proposition .4. Suppose that the environment E satisfies Assumptions 3.1
and 3.2. Assume I ≥ 2. Given any incentive compatible SCF f, for al-
l τ¯ > 0, there exists a mechanism (M, τ¯) such that for any t ∈ T¯ and
m ∈ W∞ (t|M, T¯ ), we have g(m) = f(t).
Fix τ¯ > 0. Choose the mechanism (M, τ¯) defined in Section 3.3.1, with the
proper scoring rule d0i given in Claim 8, and λ under γ
′ = γ (which is defined
in Section 3.3.1). To prove Proposition B.1, it suffices to show that for any




, then m−1i = t¯i. This is because from
here we can fill the gap of the argument by adapting the proof of Theorem 2.
The rest of the proof builds upon the following three claims.














Proof. Let σi be defined such that σi (t¯i) = (t¯i, ..., t¯i) for player i of type t¯i.
Note that we use this notation throughout Section A.1. We prove this claim
in two steps.
Step 1: σi(t¯i) ∈ W∞i (t¯i|M, T¯ ) for any i, and t¯i.
Fix t¯ ∈ T¯ . Note first that we trivially have σ(t¯) ∈ W 0(t¯|M, T¯ ). For any
k ≥ 0, assume that σ(t¯) ∈ W k(t¯|M, T¯ ). Then, we shall show that σ(t¯) ∈
W k+1(t¯|M, T¯ ). This is equivalent to showing the following: for any m˜i ∈Mi,
either σi(t¯i) is always at least as good as m˜i or σi(t¯i) is a strictly better reply to
some strategies of the other players than m˜i. We verify this by considering the
following two cases of m˜i: (i) m˜
−2
i 6= σ−2i (t¯i) and m˜ki = σki (t¯i) for all k ≥ −1;
(ii) m˜ki 6= σki (t¯i) for some k ≥ −1. In Case (i), due to the construction of
the mechanism, σi(t¯i) is at least as good as m˜i for any σˆ−i : T¯−i → M−i by
inequality (3.14). In Case (ii), against the conjecture σ−i, σi(t¯i) is a strictly
better message than m˜i by the argument in Claims 2, 3 and 3.5. Therefore, no
m˜i can weakly dominate σi(t¯i). Thus, σ(t¯) ∈ W k+1(t¯|M, T¯ ). This completes
the proof of Step 1.


















m−2i 6= t¯i. We shall show that no m˜i can weakly dominate (m−2i , t¯i, ..., t¯i) by
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considering the following two cases of m˜i: (i) m˜
−2
i 6= σ−2i (t¯i) and m˜ki = σki (t¯i)
for all k ≥ −1; (ii) m˜ki 6= σki (t¯i) for some k ≥ −1. In Case (i), due to the
construction of the mechanism, (m−2i , t¯i, . . . , t¯i) is at least as good as m˜i for
any σˆ−i : T¯−i → M−i by inequality (3.14). In Case (ii),
(
m−2i , t¯i, ..., t¯i
)
is a
strictly better message than m˜i against conjecture σ−i by the argument in
Case (ii) of Step 1. Thus, no m˜i can weakly dominate (m
−2
i , t¯i, ..., t¯i). This
completes the proof.
Claim .11. Fix any player i and type t¯i. If mi ∈ W∞i (t¯i|M, T¯ ), then (t¯i,m−1i , t¯i, ..., t¯i) ∈
W∞i (t¯i|M, T¯ ).
Proof. By Step 1 in the proof of Claim B.2, it suffices to consider the case
that m−1i 6= t¯i. By considering the following two cases, we shall show that no
m˜i can weakly dominate (t¯i,m
−1
i , t¯i, ..., t¯i): (i) m˜
−1
i 6= m−1i and m˜ki = t¯i for all
k 6= −1; (ii) m˜ki 6= t¯i for some k 6= −1.
In Case (i), we proceed in two steps.
Step 1: We show that for any m˜i , if m˜
−1
i 6= m−1i and m˜ki = mki for all
k 6= −1, mi is strictly better than m˜i against some conjecture σˆ−i such that




for all t¯−i ∈ T¯−i.
Since mi ∈ W∞i (t¯i|M, T¯ ), one of the following two cases must hold: (1)
player i of type t¯i is indifferent between m˜i and mi against any conjecture
σ′−i such that σ
′
−i(t¯−i) ∈ W∞−i(t¯−i|M, T¯ ) for all t¯−i; and (2) mi is strictly
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better than m˜i for player i of type t¯i against some conjecture σˆ−i such that
σˆ−i(t¯−i) ∈ W∞−i(t¯−i|M, T¯ ) for all t¯−i ∈ T¯−i.
By Claim B.1, Case (1) is impossible. Thus, we must have Case (2). Since
mi and m˜i only differ in round −1, the utility gain for player i of type t¯i
by using mi rather than m˜i is concentrated in the payment rule λd
0
i , which
is larger than γ by inequality (B.1). Next, the utility loss comes from the
random dictator component of the outcome function, which is bounded above
from E. By inequality (3.13), we know γ−E > 0. Thus, mi is strictly better
than m˜i.
Step 2: We show that for any m˜i , if m˜
−1
i 6= m−1i and m˜ki = t¯i for all k 6= −1,
(t¯i,m
−1
i , t¯i, ..., t¯i) is strictly better than m˜i against some conjecture σ˜−i such
that σ˜−i(t¯−i) ∈ W∞−i(t¯−i|M, T¯ ) for all t¯−i ∈ T¯−i.
Since m−1i 6= t¯i and mi ∈ W∞i (t¯i|M, T¯ ), by Claim B.1, there exist a
nonempty set of players J ⊂ I\{i} and a collection of strategies {σˆj}j∈J such
that σˆj(t¯j) ∈ W∞j (t¯j|M, T¯ ) and σˆ−2j (t¯j) 6= t¯j for all j ∈ J and t¯j ∈ T¯j. From
Claim B.2, we know that (σˆ−2j (t¯j), t¯j, ..., t¯j) ∈ W∞j (t¯j|M, T¯ ) for all j ∈ J. Let
σ˜−i be defined such that σ˜−2−i (t¯−i) = σˆ
−2
−i (t¯−i) and σ˜
k
−i(t¯−i) = σ−i(t¯−i) for all
t¯−i ∈ T¯−i and k ≥ −1. Thus, σ˜−i(t¯−i) ∈ W∞−i(t¯−i|M, T¯ ) for all t¯−i ∈ T¯−i.
Fix such conjecture σ˜−i. Since (t¯i,m−1i , t¯i, ..., t¯i) and m˜i only differ in round
−1, the utility gain for player i of type t¯i by using (t¯i,m−1i , t¯i, ..., t¯i) rather than
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m˜i is concentrated in the payment rule λd
0
i , which is larger than γ. Next, the
utility loss through the random dictator component of the outcome function,
which is bounded above from E. Since we know that γ − E > 0 from the
proof of Step 1, (t¯i,m
−1
i , t¯i, ..., t¯i) is strictly better than m˜i against conjecture
σ˜−i.
In Case (ii), (t¯i,m
−1
i , t¯i, ..., t¯i) is strictly better than m˜i against some con-
jecture, as we can make an argument parallel to Step 2 in the proof of Claim
B.2.
Thus, no m˜i can weakly dominate (t¯i,m
−1
i , t¯i, ..., t¯i). This completes the
proof.
Claim .12. Fix any i ∈ I and t¯i ∈ T¯i. If mi ∈ W∞i (t¯i|M, T¯ ), then m−1i = t¯i.
Proof. Suppose not, that is, there exists some mi ∈ W∞i (t¯i|M, T¯ ) with m−1i 6=
t¯i. Then by Claim B.3, (t¯i,m
−1
i , t¯i, ..., t¯i) ∈ W∞i (t¯i|M, T¯ ). Since the indicator
function e(·) has a positive weight in this case, by inequality (3.14), we conclude
that for any j ∈ I\{i} and t¯j ∈ T¯j, if mj ∈ W∞j (t¯j|M, T¯ ), then m−2j = t¯j.
Since mi ∈ W∞i (t¯i|M, T¯ ), by Claim 3.2, whenever m−1i 6= t¯i, mi is weakly
dominated by (m−2i , t¯i,m
0
i , . . . ,m
K
i ). This is a contradiction.
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.1.2 Proof of Claim 3.8
Recall that T¯i = {t1i , t2i } = {(1, 0), (0, 1)} for each i ∈ I and A = {(1, 0), (0, 1)}.
Recall also that we set δ = 1 in Claim 3.8. So, player i’s preferences only
depend on player i + 1’s type. To simplify the notation, we write player i’s
preferences as follows: ui(a, t) ≡ ui(a, t−i) = a · ti+1, for any a ∈ A and t ∈ T¯ .





i ∈ T¯i\{ti}. Then we show that σ′i(ti) ∈ S∞i Wi(ti|M, T¯ )
by the following lemmas. For each i ∈ I, we define αi : T¯i → T¯i such that
αi(ti) 6= ti for all ti ∈ T¯i.
First, we show that a non-truthful announcement by all players constitutes
a Bayes Nash equilibrium in the direct-revelation mechanism (T¯ , f ∗) in Lemma
B.5.










Proof. In player i’s view, other players’ types are perfectly correlated. Besides,
f ∗ is a majority rule. Therefore, in player i’s view, player i cannot change
the outcome by his unilateral deviation when the other players are making a
consistent (false) announcement. Thus, we complete the proof.
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i+1)− ui(xi(ti), t′i+1) > 0 if
ti 6= t′i = t′i+1.






a · ti + 1
3
a · t′i,
where ti 6= t′i. Therefore, player i of type ti strictly prefers a to the other
outcome if and only if a = ti. Since {xi(ti)}i∈I,ti∈T¯i satisfies inequality (3.31)
and there are only two outcomes contained in A, it must be that xi(ti)[a] > 1/2
if and only if ti = a. Since ui (a, t−i) = a·ti+1, ui(xi(t′i), t′i+1)−ui(xi(ti), t′i+1) > 0
if ti 6= t′i = t′i+1.
Lemma .7. For every i ∈ I and ti ∈ T¯i, we have σ′i(ti) ∈ S∞i Wi(ti|M, T¯ ).
Proof. We prove Lemma B.7 in the following three steps.
Step 1: For every i ∈ I and ti ∈ T¯i, against conjecture σ′−i, σ′i (ti) is a strictly




i for any k ≥ −1.
Fix any m˜i. First, consider the case that m˜
k
i 6= t′i for some k ∈ {−1, 0}.
The utility gain in payment rule λd0i from using σ
′





















)− d0i (t′−i, ti)] pii (t′i) [t′−i]
> γ,
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where ti+1 = ti+2 = ti 6= t′i = t′i+1 = t′i+2 and the first equality follows
from that pii(ti)[t−i] = pii(t′i)[t
′
−i] in this example; the last inequality follows
from inequality (3.10). All the possible loss (from using σ′i(ti) rather than
m˜i) consists of (i) the utility loss in the random dictatorial component of the
outcome function weighted by e(·) function, which is bounded above from E;
(ii) the utility loss in di, which is bounded above from ξ; (iii) the utility loss
in dki for all k ≥ 1. The total loss is bounded above from E + ξ +Kη.
For any outcome that depends on kth message profile, if m˜ki 6= t′i, σ′i(ti) is
at least as good as m˜i by inequality (B.2).
By inequality (3.13), we know γ > E + ξ + Kη. Therefore, σ′i(ti) is a
strictly better reply to σ′−i than any such m˜i.






i 6= t′i for some k ≥ 1.
For any k ≥ 1, in terms of the outcome that depends on the kth message
profile, if m˜ki 6= t′i, σ′i(ti) is at least as good as m˜i by inequality (B.2). In terms




i) is a consistent message, the utility gain
(from using σ′i(ti) rather than m˜i) in the payment rules di and d
k
i for all k ≥ 1
is bounded below by ξ + η. Therefore, σ′i(ti) is a strictly better reply to σ
′
−i
than any such m˜i. This completes the proof of Step 1.
Step 2: For every i ∈ I and ti ∈ T¯i, σ′i(ti) ∈ W 1i (ti|M, T¯ ).
Fix any player i of type ti and m˜i 6= σ′i(ti). Then, it suffices to show that
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no m˜i can weakly dominate σ
′
i(ti). More specifically, Taking the previous step
into account, we can decompose our argument into the following two cases of
m˜i:
Case (i) m˜−2i 6= t′i and m˜ki = t′i for all k ≥ −1.
Let m¯−i ∈M−i be defined such that m¯−1j = m¯0j for all j 6= i. Therefore, we










i . Let m˜−i ∈M−i be defined
such that m˜−1j 6= m˜0j for some j 6= i. Then, we have e((m−1i , m˜−1−i ), (m0i , m˜0−i)) =
 for all mi. Let ν be a conjecture of type ti such that ν(m¯−i|t−i) = 1 and
ν(m˜−i|t′−i) = 1 where ti+1 = ti+2 = ti 6= t′i = t′i+1 = t′i+2. Then, the utility net
gain for player i of type ti from choosing σ
′
i(ti) rather than m˜i is given:
{
0× ui(xi(t′i), t−i)pii(ti)[t−i] + × ui(xi(t′i), t′−i)pii(ti)[t′−i]
}













where the last inequality follows from Lemma B.6. Therefore, σ′i(ti) is a strictly
better reply to ν than any such m˜i.
Case (ii) m˜ki 6= t′i for some k ≥ −1.
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By Step 1, we conclude that σ′i(ti) is a strictly better message to conjecture
σ′−i than any such m˜i. Thus, no m˜i can weakly dominate σ
′
i(ti) so that σ
′
i(ti) ∈
W 1i (ti|M, T¯ ). This completes the proof of Step 2.
Step 3: For every i ∈ I and ti ∈ T¯i, we have σ′i(ti) ∈ S∞i Wi(ti|M, T¯ ).
Fix conjecture σ′−i and any m˜i. We first show that for each player i of type
ti, σ
′
i(ti) is a best response to σ
′
−i by considering the following two cases: (i)
m˜−2i 6= t′i and m˜ki = t′i for all k ≥ −1; (ii) m˜ki 6= t′i for some k ≥ −1. In Case
(i), player i of type ti is indifferent between m˜i and σ
′
i(ti) since the indicator
function e(·) has a value of 0. In Case (ii), it follows immediately from Step
1. Thus, for every i ∈ I and ti ∈ T¯i, we have σ′i(ti) ∈ S2i (ti|M, T¯ ). Fix
i ∈ I and ti ∈ T¯i. For each k ≥ 2, we assume by our inductive hypothesis
that σ′i(ti) ∈ Ski (ti|M, T¯ ). Then, we can conclude that σ′i(ti) ∈ Sk+1i (ti|M, T¯ ),
since we can always fix σ′−i as a conjecture of player i of type ti. This completes
the proof of Step 3.
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Appendix A
Proofs of Chapter One
Revisit to the necessary condition in Moore and
Repullo (1988)
In this section, we restate the necessary condition, i.e., Condition C, in The-
orem 1 of Moore and Repullo (1988) and show that Condition C is trivially
satisfied in qusilinear environment.
Condition C For each pair of profiles θ and φ in Θ, and for each a ∈ f (θ)
but a 6∈ f (φ) , there exists a finite sequence
a (θ, φ; a) ≡ {a0 = a, a1, ..., ak, ..., ah = x, ah+1 = y} ⊂ A,
with h = h (θ, φ; a) ≥ 1, such that:
(1) for each k = 0, ..., h−1, there is some particular agent j (k) = j (k|θ, φ; a) ,
say, for whom
akR
j(k) (θ) ak+1; and
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(2) there is some particular agent j (h) = j (h|θ, φ; a) , say, for whom
[x =] ahR
j(h) (θ) ah+1 [= y] and [y =] ah+1P
j(h)ah [= x] .
Further, h (θ, φ; a) is uniformly bounded by some h¯ <∞.
We first show that with sufficiently large transfers, Conditon C is trivially
satisfied in qusilinear environment.
To see Condition C is trivially satisfied when large enough transfers are
allowed, we consider a pair of states {(θi, θ−i) , (θ′i, θ−i)} and a = f (θi, θ−i) 6=
f (θ′i, θ−i) .
Since the state space is finite, there exists a large enough bound T¯ ∈ R+,
and tx, ty ≤ T¯ , x, y ∈ A, such that {x, tx} and {y, ty} is a pair of outcomes,
satisfying
ui (x, θi)− tx > ui (y, θi)− ty,
ui (x, θ
′
i)− tx < ui (y, θ′i)− ty.
Further, ui (a, θi) > ui (a
′, θi)− t, for all θi ∈ Θi, for any t ∈ {tx, ty}.
Now, let the finite sequence be
a (θ, φ; a) ≡ {a0 = a, a1 = {x, tx} , a2 = {y, ty}} .
Let j (0) = j (1) = i. We have
ui (a, θi) > ui (x, θi)− tx > ui (y, θi)− ty
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that is, (1) in Condition C holds;
and
ui (x, θi)− tx > ui (y, θi)− ty,
ui (x, θ
′
i)− tx < ui (y, θ′i)− ty
that is, (2) in Condition C holds.
We show that with full use of lotteries, the large payments can be decreased
into arbitrarily small scale.
Recall that for any distinct types θi and θ
′




ui(xθi,θ′i , θi) > ui(xθ′i,θi , θi);
ui(xθi,θ′i , θ
′
i) < ui(xθ′i,θi , θ
′
i).




(1− pa)a+ paxθi,θ′i , θi
)− t > ui((1− pa)a+ paxθ′i,θi , θi)− t;
ui((1− pa)a+ paxθi,θ′i , θ′i)− t < ui
(
(1− pa)a+ paxθ′i,θi , θ′i
)− t.
In our mechanism, the finite sequence is
a (θ, φ; a) ≡ {a0 = a, a1 = {(1− pa)a+ paxθi,θ′i ,−t} , a2 = {(1− pa)a+ paxθ′i,θi ,−t}} .
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Appendix B
Proofs of Chapter Three
Order Independence
In this Appendix, we show that our mechanism also works under iterative
deletion of weakly dominated strategies, i.e., W∞ and moreover, the order of
removal of strategies in W∞ is irrelevant in our mechanism.
We now define the process of iterative removal of weakly dominated strate-
gies. We seek to define mechanisms for which the order of removal of weakly
dominated strategies is irrelevant, that is, given an arbitrary type profile, any
message profile in the set of iteratively weakly undominated strategies can im-
plement the socially desired outcome at that type profile. Given a mechanism
M, let U(M, T¯ ) denote an incomplete information game associated with a
model T¯ . Fix a game U(M, T¯ ), player i ∈ I and type t¯i ∈ T¯i. Let H be a
profile of correspondences (Hi)i∈I where Hi is a mapping from T¯i to a subset of
Mi. A message mi ∈ Hi (t¯i) is weakly dominated with respect to H for player
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ui(g(mi, σ−i (t−i)), θˆi(ti)) + τi (mi, σ−i (t−i))
]
pii (ti) [t−i]
for all σ−i : T¯−i → M−i such that σ−i (t−i) ∈ H−i (t−i) and a strict inequality











= Mi; (ii) for any mi ∈ W k+1i
(
t¯i|M, T¯
) \W ki (t¯i|M, T¯ ) , mi


















dominated with respect to W∞ for player i of type t¯i.
Let W∞
(





is nonempty for any k. Thus, W∞ is nonempty. Note that
W∞
(
t¯|M, T¯ ) is dependent on the sequence {W k}∞
k=0
. However, we will show
that for any t ∈ T¯ and m ∈ W∞ (t|M, T¯ ), we have g(m) = f(t). That is,
the socially desired outcome achieved in W∞ is obtained by any elimination
order.
We first establish the following claim.
1We consider player i’s belief over other players’ pure strategies. However, this formula-
tion is equivalent to taking player i’s belief as a conjecture over other players’ (correlated)
mixed strategies, i.e., σ−i : T¯−i → ∆ (M−i) such that σ−i (t−i) [H−i (t−i)] = 1.
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Claim B.1. Assume that the environment E satisfies Assumption 2. Given
γ′ > 0. There exist λ > 0 and a proper scoring rule d0i such that for any t
′
i,








σˆ−2−i (t−i) , t
′
i
)− d0i (σˆ−2−i (t−i) , t′′i )] pii (ti) [t−i]
∣∣∣∣∣∣ > γ′. (B.1)
Proof. Fix any i. Let
D0i =
d0i ∈ RT¯ : ∑
t−i∈T¯−i
[
d0i (t−i, ti)− d0i (t−i, t′i)
]
p¯ii (ti) [t−i] > 0,∀ti 6= t′i
 .
D0i is the set of proper scoring rules in RT¯ . By Lemma 2, D0i is a nonempty
open set. Let
I0i =





σˆ−2−i (t−i) , t
′
i
)− d0i (σˆ−2−i (t−i) , t′′i )] p¯ii (ti) [t−i] 6= 0,∀ti 6= t′i,∀σˆ−2−i
 .





i ∩ I0i ) has a positive measure in RT¯ . Thus we can find
a proper scoring rule d0i such that for any σˆ
−2
−i : T¯−i → T¯−i and t′i, t′′i ∈ T¯i with






σˆ−2−i (t−i) , t
′
i
)− d0i (σˆ−2−i (t−i) , t′′i )] pii (ti) [t−i] 6= 0.
Finally, since T¯ is finite, for any γ′ > 0, we can find some λ > 0 such that
for any σˆ−2−i : T¯−i → T¯−i and t′i, t′′i ∈ T¯i with t′i 6= t′′i , inequality (B.1) holds.
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Proposition B.1. Suppose that the environment E satisfies Assumptions 3.1
and 3.2. Assume I ≥ 2. Given any incentive compatible SCF f, for al-
l τ¯ > 0, there exists a mechanism (M, τ¯) such that for any t ∈ T¯ and
m ∈ W∞ (t|M, T¯ ), we have g(m) = f(t).
Fix τ¯ > 0. Choose the mechanism (M, τ¯) defined in Section 3.3.1, with the
proper scoring rule d0i given in Claim 8, and λ under γ
′ = γ (which is defined
in Section 3.3.1). To prove Proposition B.1, it suffices to show for any i ∈ I




, then m−1i = t¯i. The rest of the proof is
identical to the proof of Theorem 3.2. We prove this result in the following
two claims.













Proof. Define σi such that σi (t¯i) = (t¯i, ..., t¯i) for player i of type t¯i. We prove
this claim in two steps.




for any i, any t¯i.
Note that σ (t¯) ∈ W 0 (t¯|M, T¯ ) . Suppose σ (t¯) ∈ W k (t¯|M, T¯ ) , for some
k ≥ 0, we show that σ (t¯) ∈ W k+1 (t¯|M, T¯ ) . For any m˜i ∈ Mi, we show
that m˜i cannot weakly dominate σi (t¯i) in two cases: (i) m˜
−2
i 6= σ−2i (t¯i) and
m˜ki = σ
k
i (t¯i) for all k ≥ −1; (ii) m˜ki 6= σki (t¯i) for some k ≥ −1. In Case
(i), σi (t¯i) is weakly better than m˜i for any σˆ−i : T¯−i → M−i by inequality
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(3.14). Therefore, m˜i cannot weakly dominate σi (t¯i) . In Case (ii), against the
conjecture σ−i, σi (t¯i) is a strictly better message than m˜i by the argument
in Claims 2, 3 and 3.5. Therefore, m˜i cannot weakly dominate σi (t¯i) . Thus,
σ (t¯) ∈ W k+1 (t¯|M, T¯ ) . This completes the proof of Step 1.













By step 1, it suffices to show
(
m−2i , t¯i, ..., t¯i
) ∈ W∞i (t¯i|M, T¯ ) for m−2i 6= t¯i.
For any m˜i ∈ Mi, we show that m˜i cannot weakly dominate
(
m−2i , t¯i, ..., t¯i
)
in two cases: (i) m˜−2i 6= σ−2i (t¯i) and m˜ki = σki (t¯i) for all k ≥ −1; (ii) m˜ki 6=
σki (t¯i) for some k ≥ −1. In Case (i), since m−2i 6= t¯i, then we must have
that e (m¯0, m¯1) = 0 for any m¯ ∈ W∞ (t¯M, T¯ ) , for any t¯. (Note that mi is
weakly dominated whenever e (m¯0, m¯1) 6= 0 for some m¯ ∈ W∞ (t¯M, T¯ ) . See
inequality (3.14)). Therefore, player i of type t¯i is indifferent between m˜i and(
m−2i , t¯i, ..., t¯i
)
. In Case (ii),
(
m−2i , t¯i, ..., t¯i
)
is a strictly better message than
m˜i against conjecture σ−i by the argument in Case (ii) of Step 1. Thus, m˜i
cannot weakly dominate
(
m−2i , t¯i, ..., t¯i
)
. This completes the proof.







i , t¯i, ..., t¯i
) ∈ W∞i (t¯i|M, T¯ ) .
Proof. By Step 1 in the proof of Claim B.2, it suffices to consider the case





i , t¯i, ..., t¯i
)
in two cases: (i) m˜−1i 6= m−1i and m˜ki = σki (t¯i) for all k 6= −1;
(ii) m˜ki 6= t¯i for some k 6= −1.
In Case (i), we proceed in two steps.
Step 1: We show that for any m˜i such that m˜
−1
i 6= m−1i and m˜ki = mki for all
k 6= −1, mi is strictly better than m˜i against some conjecture σˆ−i such that









, one of the following two cases must hold: (1)
player i of type t¯i is indifferent between m˜i and mi against any conjecture
σ′−i such that σ
′




for all t¯−i; and (2) mi is strictly
better than m˜i for player i of type t¯i against some conjecture σˆ−i such that





By Claim B.1, Case (1) is impossible. Thus, we must have Case (2). Since
mi and m˜i only differs in round −1, the utility difference for player i of type
t¯i by using mi rather than m˜i is concentrated in the payment rule λd
0
i (larger
than γ by inequality (B.1) together with a potential utility loss through e
function (bounded above by E), which is at least larger than γ − E. By
inequality (3.13), γ − E > 0.
Step 2: We show that for any m˜i such that m˜
−1
i 6= m−1i and m˜ki = t¯i for all
k 6= −1, (t¯i,m−1i , t¯i, ..., t¯i) is strictly better than m˜i against some conjecture










, by Claim 2, there exists a nonemp-
ty set of players J ⊂ I\{i} such that σˆ−2j (t¯j) 6= t¯j for all j ∈ J, of type t¯j.
From Claim B.2, we know that
(
σˆ−2j (t¯j) , t¯j, ..., t¯j
) ∈ W∞j (t¯j|M, T¯ ) for all
j ∈ J. Define σ˜−i such that σ˜−2−i (t¯−i) = σˆ−2−i (t¯−i) and σ˜k−i (t¯−i) = σ−i (t¯−i) for









i , t¯i, ..., t¯i
)
and m˜i only differs in round −1,




i , t¯i, ..., t¯i
)
rather
than m˜i is concentrated in the payment rule λd
0
i together with a potential
utility loss through e function, which is larger than γ − E by the proof of




i , t¯i, ..., t¯i
)
.




i , t¯i, ..., t¯i
)
, as we can make
an argument parallel to Step 2 in the proof of Claim B.2.




i , t¯i, ..., t¯i
)
. This completes the
proof.




, then m−1i = t¯i.









i , t¯i, ..., t¯i
) ∈ W∞i (t¯i|M, T¯ ) .










Claim 3.2, we have m−1i = t¯i. This is a contradiction.
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Proof of Claim in Example 1
Since now player i’s preferences only depends on player i+1’s type, for simplic-
ity of notation, we write player i’s preference as follows, ui (a, t) ≡ ui (a, ti+1) =
a · ti+1, for any a and any t.
For any τ¯ > 0, for Example 1, we adopt a mechanism (M, τ¯) defined





such that ti 6= t′i for all player i ∈ I and all ti ∈ T¯i. We will show that




, for all i and ti. We prove this in the following
claims. Throughout this section, we write ti = tj 6= t′j = t′i for all i, j ∈ I.
Therefore, t′−i 6= t−i if and only if t′j 6= ti for all j 6= i.







i (t−i)) , ti+1) pii (ti) [t−i] ≥
∑
t−i∈T¯−i
ui (f (ti, σ
′
i (t−i)) , ti+1) pii (ti) [t−i] .
(B.2)




in this example. Therefore,
by the construction of f, f does not depend on player i’s type, from player i’s
perspective.
Claim B.6. Fix any set of lotteries {xi (ti)}i∈I,ti∈Ti such that satisfying in-
equality (3.31). For any player i of type ti, xi (ti) [a] >
1
2
if and only if ti = a.
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Proof. Consider any outcome a. Player i of type ti’s interim utility is as follows:
∑
ti+1
ui (a, ti+1) =
2
3
a · ti + 1
3
a · t′i.
Therefore, we can see player i of type ti strictly prefer a to the other outcome
whenever a = ti. Since {xi (ti)}i∈I,ti∈Ti is such that inequality (3.31) holds, and
there are only two outcome in A, we must have xi (ti) [a] >
1
2
if and only if
ti = a.
Claim B.7. In the game U






Note that σ′ (t) ∈ W 0 (t|M, T¯ ) . Suppose σ′ (t) ∈ S k˜ (t|M, T¯ ) , for some
k˜ ≥ 0, we show that σ′ (t¯) ∈ S k˜+1 (t¯|M, T¯ ) . Consider player i of type ti. For
any m˜i ∈Mi, we show that m˜i cannot weakly dominate σ′i (ti) in the following
two cases.
Case (i) m˜−2i 6= t′i and m˜ki = t′i for all k ≥ −1.













0 when m−1i = m
0













) =  for all mi. Let ν be a conjecture of
type ti such that ν[m¯−i|ti+1, ti+2] = 1 and ν[m˜−i|t′i+1, t′i+2] = 1. The expected
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payoff gain for player i of type ti from choosing σ
′
i (ti) rather than m˜i is
{






















The last inequality follows from Claim B.6. Therefore, m˜i cannot weakly dom-
inate σ′i (ti) .
Case (ii) m˜ki 6= t′i for some k ≥ −1.
We show that against conjecture σ′−i, σ
′
i (ti) is a strictly better message than
m˜i. First, consider m˜
k
i 6= t′i where k = 0 or 1. In terms of outcome dependent
on kth message profile where k ≥ 1, if m˜ki 6= t′i, σ′i (ti) is better message than
m˜i by (B.2). Therefore, the utility difference for player i of type t¯i by using
σ′i (ti) rather than m˜i in the payment rule λd
0
i together with a potential utility







σ′−i (t−i) , t
′
i










)− d0i (t′−i, ti)] pii (t′i) [t′−i]
> γ,
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in this example; the last inequality follows from inequality (3.10). By inequal-
ity (3.13), γ > E. Therefore, m˜i cannot weakly dominate σ
′
i (ti) .
Finally, consider m˜ki 6= t′i for some k ≥ 1.In terms of outcome dependent
on kth message profile where k ≥ 1, if m˜ki 6= t′i, σ′i (ti) is better message than
m˜i by (B.2). In terms of payments, σ
′
i (ti) is a strictly better message than m˜i
by the construction of σ′i (ti) .
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